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Abstract 
 
  This article discusses how the Food and Drug Administration has come to adopt 
informal guidance (agency advice that influences regulated entities but does not carry the 
force and effect of law) as its primary method of policymaking, as opposed to more 
formalized procedures like notice-and-comment rulemaking or case-specific adjudication. 
Using major developments in administrative law and modifications to the FDA's 
regulatory regime as milestones, I trace how and why the FDA's use of informal guidance 
to fulfill its statutory mandate has changed over the past century. Along the way, I 
identify important doctrinal questions that persist today, namely (1) whether informal 
advisory opinions bind the FDA and (2) the degree of judicial deference guidance 
documents should receive under the Supreme Court's decisions in Chevron and Mead. I 
attempt to resolve these doctrinal ambiguities. I then undertake a normative analysis of 
the FDA's increasing reliance on informal guidance, and conclude that, on the whole, this 
development has benefited the FDA's major stakeholders: regulated entities, the general 
public, and the agency itself. I close with modest proposals for reform and suggestions 
for further research. The article features an appendix with several tables illustrating the 
FDA's output of informal guidance documents by year, to facilitate further study.   
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Introduction 
  In the modern U.S. administrative state, Congress delegates a great deal of 
interpretive and regulatory authority to administrative agencies by enacting broad, open-
ended statutes with the expectation that the agencies will fill in the gaps.
2 Agencies use a 
variety of policymaking tools to fill these gaps, including (1) rulemaking,
3 (2) 
adjudication, and (3) informal guidance.
4 Rulemaking is a policymaking process akin to 
congressional legislation in which the agency is required to "provide notice of the 
proposed [policy] and to accept public comments;"
5 adjudication is the administrative 
equivalent of case-specific judicial enforcement;
6 and guidance constitutes informal 
agency advice that influences regulated entities but does not carry the force and effect of 
law.
7 Guidance documents include "enforcement guidelines, policy statements, 
interpretive rules (explicating a statute or regulation), and the like."
8 Informal guidance 
                                                 
2 E.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) (quoting Morton v. 
Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)); James Hunnicutt, Another Reason to Reform the Federal Regulatory 
System: Agencies' Treating Nonlegislative Rules as Binding Law, 41 B.C. L. REV. 153, 155-56 (1999); Cass 
R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 188-198 (2006); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference 
to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 516-17 ("Congress now knows that the 
ambiguities it creates, whether intentionally or unintentionally, will be resolved, within the bounds of 
permissible interpretation, not by the courts but by a particular agency, whose policy biases will ordinarily 
be known."). But see generally Mark Seidenfeld, Chevron's Foundation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 273 
(2011) (rejecting the notion of "congressional intent to delegate interpretive primacy to agencies"). 
3 Policies promulgated through rulemaking are known as "regulations," "legislative rules," or just "rules." 
See Hunnicutt, supra note 2, at 153. Rulemaking is in turn split into two categories: informal and formal 
rulemaking. Id. at 159 (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 556-57 (1994)). Because the overwhelming majority of 
regulations are promulgated through informal rulemaking, id., the reader may safely assume that every 
instance of the word "rulemaking" in this article refers to informal rulemaking. 
4 See generally M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1386 
(2004); see also 5 U.S.C. §§ 553-57 (2011). 
5 The rulemaking process imposes other procedural requirements as well. For an excellent summary, see, 
e.g., Connor N. Raso, Strategic or Sincere? Analyzing Agency Use of Guidance Documents, 119 YALE L.J. 
782, 788 (2010); Anne Joseph O'Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the 
Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 900-02 (2008). Rules promulgated by agencies are 
"legally binding, generally applicable, and nonretroactive." Raso, supra at 788. 
6 Magill, supra note 4, at 1386.  
7 Id. Guidance documents are also often referred to as "nonlegislative rules," "interpretative rules," 
"statements of policy," or "guidelines," as well as "innumerable" other synonyms. Hunnicutt, supra note 2, 
at 153, 177. For an excellent and extensive definition of guidance, see Raso, supra note 5, at 785 n.1. 
8 Magill, supra note 4, at 1386; see also Raso, supra note 5, at 785 n.1.   - 4 - 
lacks many of the procedural safeguards of rulemaking and adjudication that protect both 
regulated entities and regulatory beneficiaries;
9 "[a]s a consequence, [an] agency cannot 
base an enforcement action solely on a regulated entity's noncompliance with a guidance 
document."
10 In other words, guidance does not bind regulated entities. Despite 
guidance's non-binding status, however, "guidance documents often have rule-like effects 
on regulated entities"
11 because they "supply valuable information to regulated entities 
regarding how an agency will implement a program."
12 While agencies have been using 
guidance since the dawn of the administrative state, only recently have agencies 
aggressively used guidance as their predominant mode of policymaking.
13 
  An agency's choice of policymaking process "is strategic. An agency must weigh 
the costs and benefits of various procedures" available to it.
14 As a result of the diversity 
between agencies, different agencies utilize these three tools in different proportions to 
                                                 
9 Hunnicutt, supra note 2, at 157-76 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (1994)). 
10 Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 
397, 406-07 (2007). 
11 Id. at 407. Some scholars have decried this aspect of informal guidance. See, e.g., Robert A. Anthony, 
Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the Like -- Should Federal Agencies Use 
Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1315 (1992) ("While these nonlegislative rules by definition 
cannot legally bind, agencies often inappropriately issue them with the intent or effect of imposing a 
practical binding norm upon the regulated or benefited public."); JAMES T. O'REILLY, FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION § 4:24 4-87 (3d ed. 2007) (quoting Byerly, FDA Administrative Procedures: The Myth 
and the Reality in FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC INDUSTRY 43 (V. Kleinfeld ed. 1972)); see generally 
Hunnicutt, supra note 2. Others have viewed the rule-like effects of guidance more charitably. Lars Noah, 
The FDA's New Policy on Guidelines: Having Your Cake and Eating it Too, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 113, 120-
142 (1997); Todd D. Rakoff, The Choice Between Formal and Informal Modes of Administrative 
Regulation, 52 ADMIN L. REV. 159 (2000). 
12 Mendelson, supra note 10, at 397. See also Erica Seiguer and John J. Smith, Perception and Process at 
the Food and Drug Administration: Obligations and Tradeoffs in Rules and Guidances, 60 FOOD & DRUG 
L.J. 17, 29-30 (2005) ("[I]n practice[,] . . . industry treats guidances no differently than rules . . . Most 
business people don't know the difference between a reg[ulation passed through rulemaking] and a 
guidance, so by and large the business field does not care. All they want is clarity [and consistency]."). 
13 Stephen M. Johnson, Good Guidance, Good Grief!, 72 MO. L. REV. 695, 695 (2007). Guidance in its 
current form is such a new phenomenon that, as late as 2000, neither the leading Administrative Law 
treatise nor eminent administrative law casebooks listed "guidance" in their indexes. Rakoff, supra note 11, 
at 160. Indeed, when the FDA issued its "Good Guidance Practices," which will be described infra Section 
I.H.2, "the FDA had to devote the first part of its statement simply to defining what it was talking about." 
Id. at 159-60. 
14 Cf. O'Connell, supra note 5, at 917 (discussing different types of policymaking, including nonlegislative 
rulemaking, i.e. guidance).   - 5 - 
fulfill their statutory mandates. For instance, whereas the National Labor Relations Board 
and the Federal Trade Commission rely heavily on case-by-case adjudication to create 
policy, the Federal Communications Commission primarily utilizes rulemaking to fulfill 
its regulatory agenda.
15 Similarly, over time, individual agencies may adjust their 
interpretive method of choice in response to changing circumstances.
16 For example, 
although formal adjudication was the predominant mode of administrative policymaking 
in the 1950s and 60s, many agencies shifted to rulemaking in the 1960s to conserve 
administrative resources and establish clear, generally applicable regulatory standards.
17 
  The Federal Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") is no exception to the 
foregoing discussion. Over time, the FDA has experimented with all three policymaking 
forms to achieve its regulatory objectives, but has ultimately settled on informal guidance 
as its policymaking weapon of choice.
18 While administrative law scholars have 
published excellent articles documenting the recent explosion of guidance at the FDA,
19 
to the best of my knowledge none have told the story of the evolution of guidance at the 
FDA from its humble beginnings at the turn of the twentieth century.  
  In this article, I trace the historical development of guidance at the FDA. Using 
watershed administrative law cases and modifications to the FDA's regulatory regime as 
milestones, I demonstrate how and why the FDA has settled upon guidance as its 
preferred mode of policymaking. Throughout, I identify doctrinally unsettled questions 
regarding the FDA's administrative and policymaking practice, namely (1) which 
                                                 
15 Magill, supra note 4, at 1399. 
16 Id. at 1398-99. 
17 Rakoff, supra note 11, at 163. 
18 Id. at 168; John C. Carey, Is Rulemaking Old Medicine at the FDA?, 3-6 (1997), in FOOD AND DRUG 
LAW: AN ELECTRONIC BOOK OF STUDENT PAPERS (Peter Barton Hutt, ed., 2011), available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/hutt/book_index.html. 
19 See generally, e.g., Rakoff, supra note 11; Seiguer and Smith, supra note 12.   - 6 - 
guidance documents the FDA is bound to follow and (2) the degree to which courts 
should defer to FDA policies/textual interpretations expressed in guidance documents. I 
offer tentative answers to these doctrinal questions. Afterwards, I evaluate whether the 
FDA's increasing reliance on guidance has been beneficial for the agency, regulated 
entities, and regulatory beneficiaries. I conclude that, on the whole, the FDA's ever-
growing use of guidance has benefited the FDA's stakeholders. I close the article with 
modest proposals for reform and identify areas for further research. 
 
I. The History of Guidance at the FDA 
A. The Genesis of Guidance 
  Although the FDA's overwhelming reliance on guidance is a relatively recent 
phenomenon,
20 the FDA and its predecessors
21 have been utilizing guidance documents 
to further their regulatory objectives for over a century.
22 Beginning in 1902, the Bureau 
of Chemistry, a prototype of the FDA that was housed within the United States 
Department of Agriculture ("USDA"), began issuing "Food Inspection Decisions" 
("FIDs") in response to questions from regulated entities.
23 The Bureau was prompted to 
utilize informal guidance by the comparative informational disadvantages of setting 
regulatory policy via individual adjudications: 
                                                 
20 Rakoff, supra note 11, at 159-60. 
21 The FDA traces its lineage to the Agricultural Division of the Patent Office, which was transferred into 
the newly created USDA around 1862. The chemical laboratory morphed into the Division of Chemistry in 
1890, and was rechristened the Bureau of Chemistry in 1901. The Bureau of Chemistry begat the Food, 
Drug, and Insecticide Administration in 1927, which in 1930 officially became the FDA. The FDA 
operated under the auspices of the USDA until 1940, when it was transferred to the Federal Security 
Agency. The FDA was in turn transferred to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, which was 
renamed the Department of Health and Human Services in 1979. Peter Barton Hutt, Symposium on the 
History of Fifty Years of Food Regulation Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act: A Historical 
Introduction, 45 FOOD DRUG COSM. L. J. 17, 18 (1990). 
22 Noah, supra note 11, at 115. 
23 United States Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Chemistry, FIDs 1-25, Introduction (1905). 
Individual FIDs will hereinafter be cited as "FID # (year of issuance)."   - 7 - 
For the information of [regulated entities] and of the public it is advisable 
to publish more widely than would be possible by decisions given to 
individuals or firms the opinions of this Department rendered by the 
Secretary under the existing law relating to the [Bureau of Chemistry's 
regulatory policies].
24 
 
FIDs advised industry of the Bureau's current thinking on numerous diverse topics, 
including the maximum allowable quantity of sulfurous acids in wines,
25 the 
impermissibility of using fictitious firm names on product labels,
26 the coloring of butter 
and cheese,
27 and the illegality of the interstate shipment of the highly alcoholic beverage 
absinthe.
28 The agency issued FIDs, as well as other informal guidance documents, in 
printed publications called Service and Regulatory Announcements ("SRAs"), which 
were at first issued monthly but were later published on an irregular basis.
29 Interestingly, 
FIDs predate the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906; FIDs 1-39 dealt only with imported 
foods and were therefore not distributed after the passage of the 1906 Act.
30 FIDs were 
always signed by the Secretary of Agriculture, and were occasionally also signed by the 
Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of Commerce; as a result, regulated entities 
gained useful insights into the plans and priorities of these agencies' leaders.
31 The 
Secretary of Agriculture took pains to emphasize that FIDs were informal guidance 
documents only, and that they did not carry the force of law: 
From the tenor of many inquiries received in this Department it appears 
that many persons suppose that the answers to inquiries addressed to this 
Department, either in letters or in published decisions, have the force and 
                                                 
24 United States Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Chemistry, FIDs 1-25, Introduction (1905). 
25 FID 28 (1905). 
26 FID 46 (1906). 
27 FID 51 (1907). 
28 FID 147 (1912). 
29 Researching FDA with Published Primary Sources, 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/ResearchTools/ResearchingFDAwithPublishedPrimar
ysources/default.htm (last visited Jun. 30, 2011) [hereinafter Primary Sources]. 
30 FID 125 (1910). 
31 Primary Sources, supra note 29.   - 8 - 
effect of the rules and regulations for the enforcement of the food and 
drugs act of June 30, 1906 . . . It seems highly desirable that an erroneous 
opinion of this kind should be corrected. The opinions or decisions of this 
Department do not add anything to the rules and regulations nor take 
anything away from them. They therefore are not to be considered in the 
light of rules and regulations. On the other hand, the decisions and 
opinions referred to express the attitude of this Department in relation to 
the interpretation of the law and the rules and regulations, and they are 
published for the information of the officials of the Department who may 
be charged with the execution of the law and especially to acquaint 
manufacturers, jobbers, and dealers with the attitude of this Department in 
these matters. They are therefore issued more in an advisory than in a 
mandatory spirit.
32 
 
  The Bureau of Chemistry's stated purposes for utilizing informal guidance were to 
conserve resources and prevent offenses: 
[I]t is evident that an overwhelming majority of the manufacturers, 
jobbers, and dealers of this country are determined to do their utmost to 
conform to the provisions of the act, to support it in every particular, and 
to accede to the opinions of this Department respecting its construction. It 
is hoped, therefore, that the publication of the opinions and decisions of 
the Department will lead to the avoidance of litigation which might arise 
due to decisions which may be reached by this Department indicating 
violations of the act, violations which would not have occurred had the 
opinions and decisions of the Department been brought to the attention of 
the offender.
33 
 
The Department of Agriculture continued issuing FIDs until shortly after 1938; by that 
time, both industry and agency employees had access to 212 documents and were able to 
conduct their operations accordingly.
34 
 
B. The Dawn of the FDA 
                                                 
32 FID 44 (1906). 
33 FID 44 (1906). 
34 Primary Sources, supra note 29.   - 9 - 
  In 1938, Congress enacted the FDA's organic statute: the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act ("FD&C").
35 Congress delegated substantial authority to the FDA to use 
whatever policymaking tools it deemed best to effectuate the FD&C's statutory mandate: 
Congress obviously knew in 1938 that it could not foresee future 
developments, and that it must proceed primarily by establishing general 
principles, permitting implementation within broad parameters, if 
regulation in this important area was to be effective . . . In this respect, the 
Act must be regarded as a constitution. It establishes a set of fundamental 
objectives — safe, effective, wholesome, and truthfully-labeled products 
— without attempting to specify every detail of regulation. The mission of 
the Food and Drug Administration is to implement these objectives 
through the most effective and efficient controls that can be devised.
36 
 
  From its inception until the early 1970s, the FDA primarily utilized case-by-case 
adjudication to enforce the FD&C's provisions.
37 However, even "[f]rom its earliest 
beginnings, the FDA found it desirable to issue guidance on which regulated firms could 
rely."
38 Starting in the late 1930s, the FDA issued advisory opinions in the form of trade 
correspondences ("TCs") "to advise regulated firms on how to comply with statutory 
requirements."
39 Like the FIDs, TCs were "excerpts from day-to-day replies to inquiries 
concerning the application of the statute to specific problems."
40 Likewise, TCs only 
purported to "represent the attitude of the Administration in the light of the facts 
submitted and other available information;" the advice within was "subject to 
modification by the Administration as additional facts [became] available and controlling 
                                                 
35 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (1938). 
36 Peter Barton Hutt, Philosophy of Regulation Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 50 FOOD 
& DRUG L.J. 101, 102 (1995 (Historical Article, originally published in 1973)). 
37 Carey, supra note 18, at 3. 
38 Noah, supra note 11, at 114. 
39 Id. at 115-16 (1997); William Van Brunt, Advisory Opinions, 32 FOOD DRUG COSM. L. J. 304, 305 
(1977). 
40 VINCENT A. KLEINFELD AND CHARLES WESLEY DUNN, FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT 
1938-1949 561 (1949) [hereinafter 1938-49].   - 10 - 
decisions [were] rendered by the Federal courts."
41 Nevertheless, TCs "provided needed 
clarification and certainty to persons attempting to comply with statutory and regulatory 
requirements, and they also benefited the Agency by assuring consistency in actions 
taken by its employees."
42 
  From 1939 to 1946, the FDA issued a total of 439 TCs regarding numerous and 
diverse products.
43 The FDA issued an average of 49 TCs per year, although this figure is 
skewed heavily by the whopping 336 TCs issued in 1940.
44 However, TCs were not 
compiled and published until 1949; rather, they "were mimeographed and distributed to 
the [agency's] staff to maintain uniformity in policy throughout the country."
45 To obtain 
insight into the inner workings of the FDA, manufacturers and retailers had to either rely 
on the correspondence they personally received from the FDA or travel to FDA 
headquarters or field offices to inspect the TCs.
46 In this respect, TCs were more informal 
and less public than FIDs. Some TCs addressed crucial concerns (e.g., statement on label 
that a nonofficial drug contains nux vomica "does not relieve the manufacturer of the 
necessity of declaring the quantity or proportion of strychnine," a pesticide that can cause 
muscular convulsions and eventual death,
47 which is "one of the constituents of nux 
vomica"),
48 while others addressed more mundane issues ("Antipasto, an appetizer 
consisting of mixed vegetable and fish products, may be accepted as the common name 
                                                 
41 Id.  
42 Noah, supra note 11, at 114. 
43 After issuing 431 TCs under its first series, the FDA created a new "A" series in November 1945. 
However, the FDA only issued eight A-series TCs before ceasing the TC program altogether. A collection 
of every TC issued by the FDA may be found in 1938-1949, supra note 40, at 561-753. TCs will 
hereinafter be cited as "TC-# (date of issuance)." 
44 See Appendix A, Figure 2, infra. 
45 Primary Sources, supra note 29. 
46 Id.  
47 Strychnine - Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strychnine (last visited July 
1, 2011). 
48 TC-270 (Aug. 20, 1940). See also TC-419 (Aug. 18, 1944) ("The labeling of a tonic containing 
strychnine should clearly indicate that it is a strychnine tonic.").   - 11 - 
of the product").
49 Some afforded invaluable advice to a wide variety of regulated entities 
(e.g., a detailed and extensive "[m]emorandum listing a number of drug preparations with 
indications concerning the nature of warning statements which are not subject to adverse 
criticism" from the FDA);
50 others were ultra-specific and arguably humorous ("The 
unqualified expression 'telephone' to indicate sieve size of canned peas constitutes 
misbranding;"
51 "The designation 'Breakfast Prunes in Syrup' is inappropriate if dried 
prunes are used;"
52 "Rubber nipples are not regarded as subject to the Act, but labeling 
claims could render them subject"
53). Some policies established by TCs have stood the 
test of time ("Sample packages distributed to physicians are not exempt from the 
mandatory labeling requirements of the Act"),
54 while others have fallen to the wayside 
("No tolerance has been announced for caffeine in soft drinks, but its addition to such 
drinks has been discouraged.").
55 All in all, the FDA used informal guidance as an 
indispensable tool in its policymaking agenda.  
 
C. The Administrative Procedure Act and the Nadir of Guidance 
  1946 marked a watershed development in administrative law: the enactment of 
the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA").
56 Drafted in response to trenchant criticisms 
                                                 
49 TC-32 (Feb. 9, 1940). 
50 TC-14 (Nov. 1, 1940). 
51 TC-291 (May 7, 1940). While your author is aware that "Tall Telephone" is a variety of garden pea, he 
nonetheless finds the mental image of a person picking up a can of peas and saying "Hello?" endlessly 
amusing. Your author further enjoys imagining our prospective pea purchaser slowly adopting a 
disappointed facial expression, announcing "I'm calling the FDA to report this!" and then holding a 
different can of peas to his ear. 
52 TC-229 (Apr. 11, 1940). 
53 TC-114 (Feb. 29, 1940). 
54 Compare TC-86 (Feb. 21, 1940) with 21 CFR § 203.38 (2011) (labeling of drug sample units). 
55 TC-144 (Mar. 7, 1940). A large number of TCs that were in place for many years were likewise 
subsequently revoked. O'REILLY, supra note 11, at § 4:25 4-94 (citing 40 Fed. Reg. 22962 (May 27, 1975); 
34 Fed. Reg. 7922 (May 20, 1969)). 
56 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq. (1946).   - 12 - 
that administrative agencies were subject to insufficient procedural limitations,
57 the APA 
was enacted "to foster clarity, uniformity and public participation in the administrative 
state."
58 In relevant part, the APA established specific procedural requirements for 
rulemaking and adjudication, as well as standards for judicial review of agency action.
59 
Although the APA's procedural safeguards were weak enough to "provide[] agencies with 
broad freedom" and thereby "permit[] the growth of the modern regulatory state,"
60 the 
APA nonetheless subjected administrative agencies to greater scrutiny by "introduc[ing] 
more formal procedures into regulatory decisionmaking, impos[ing] a kind of 
judicialization on the administrative process, . . . and increas[ing] the supervisory powers 
of the courts over the administrative agencies."
61 
  In response to the APA's renewed emphasis on procedural rigor, the FDA 
"concluded that opinions which would otherwise have emanated as trade correspondence 
should thereafter be issued more formally" to comply with the strictures of the APA.
62 As 
a result, no TCs were issued after 1946. Rather, the FDA published guidance documents 
in the Federal Register and the Code of Federal Regulations as "Statements of General 
                                                 
57 For example, "[i]n a widely publicized report published in 1938, Roscoe Pound, chairman of the special 
committee of the ABA on administrative law, excoriated the regulatory system for 'administrative 
absolutism' and catalogued the suspect 'tendencies' of administrative agencies, among them: (1) to decide 
without a hearing, (2) to decide on the basis of matters not before the tribunal, (3) to decide on the basis of 
preformed opinions, (4) to disregard jurisdictional limits, (5) to do what will get by, (6) to mix up 
rulemaking, investigation, and prosecution, as well as the functions of advocate, judge, and enforcement 
authority." Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1264-66 
(1986) (citing Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 63 A.B.A. REP. 331, 346-51 
(1938)). 
58 Hunnicutt, supra note 2, at 153-54. 
59 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (1946). 
60 George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal 
Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1559 (1996). 
61 Wolf Heydebrand, Government Litigation and National Policymaking: From Roosevelt to Reagan, 24 
LAW & SOC'Y REV. 477, 488-89 (1990). 
62 1938-49, supra note 40, 561.   - 13 - 
Policy or Interpretation" (hereinafter "Statements").
63 Statements were therefore more 
public and more formal than both the TCs and the FIDs that preceded them. Because 
greater proceduralization increases the economic cost of agency policymaking,
64 the 
enactment of the APA, "together with the passage of time since the enactment of the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act," reduced the number of opinions and guidance 
documents issued during this period.
65 Whereas, during the heyday of the TCs, the FDA 
issued an average of 49 guidance documents a year, the FDA only issued about 5 
Statements annually between 1947 and 1956.
66 
  Despite this increase in procedural formality, however, Statements still fell within 
the category of informal guidance because the FDA did not utilize the newly-minted 
notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures established by the APA to promulgate them. 
Even though they were published in the Code of Federal Regulations, Statements only 
needed to comply with the "Public Information" sections of the APA.
67 Statements 
therefore did not require costly and time-consuming procedures to promulgate. 
                                                 
63 Id. 
64 E.g., Rakoff, supra note 11, at 164-65. 
65 1938-49, supra note 40, 561. 
66 Compare Appendix A, Figure 2, infra, with Appendix A, Figure 3, infra. I should note, however, that the 
average annual number of TCs is skewed heavily by the massive number of TCs issued in 1940. 
Furthermore, I have not performed a quantitative analysis to determine whether this divergence is 
statistically significant, so my conclusion is necessarily impressionistic. Finally, correlation is not 
causation; a more rigorous examination, controlling for more variables, would be necessary to confirm that 
the enactment of the APA in fact resulted in fewer guidance documents. Given the massive overhaul of 
administrative procedure that the APA effected, however, this inference is extremely plausible. 
67 See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 3.1 (historical version, 1947) (citing § 3, 60 Stat. 237 (1946)). Had the FDA been 
required to utilize notice-and-comment procedures, the regulations would also have cited the rulemaking 
requirements of the APA, codified in § 4 of 60 Stat. 237. See also Eve H. Bachrach, Federal Regulation of 
Soap Products, in THE COSMETIC INDUSTRY: SCIENTIFIC AND REGULATORY FOUNDATIONS, 61, 64 
(Norman F. Estrin, ed. 1984); VINCENT A. KLEINFELD AND CHARLES WESLEY DUNN, FEDERAL FOOD, 
DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT 1953-1957 xiii (1957) (distinguishing between Statements of General Policy or 
Interpretation and regulations promulgated with "the force and effect of law") [hereinafter 1953-57]; 5 
U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2011) ("interpretative rules" and "general statements of policy" exempt from the 
required rulemaking procedures established by the APA); 22 Fed. Reg. 7393 (1957) (stating that FDA 
Statement issued in conformity with APA's public information procedures but not its rulemaking 
requirements).   - 14 - 
  Like the TCs, the Statements only purported to be "day-by-day informal 
announcements and answers by the Administration on current problems . . . the opinions 
expressed in them necessarily change from time to time as more experience and data are 
gathered and interpretations of the statutory provisions are made by the courts."
68 Also 
like their predecessors, Statements provided crucial guidance to regulated entities 
regarding numerous interesting issues of public concern. (e.g., "The Federal Security 
Agency no longer regards all salt substitutes as new drugs;"
69 "Labeling of Antibiotic 
Drugs for Veterinary Use;"
70 "The use of antibiotic drugs as food preservatives 
constitutes a public health hazard . . . [and] may be deemed an adulteration."
71) Issuing 
these policies as guidance documents afforded the FDA great flexibility; from time to 
time, the FDA, via announcements and orders in the Federal Register, revoked previous 
Statements as they became obsolete or were superseded by statutory developments.
72  
 
D. The Continuum of Formality 
  In late 1957, the FDA announced "[a] new advisory information service" for 
industry that "provide[d] for the publication in the Federal Register from time to time of 
informal statements on subjects of trade interest."
73 The FDA thereby divided its 
Statements of General Policy or Interpretation into two general categories: Subpart A, 
denominated "Formal Statements of Policy or Interpretation," and the new Subpart B, 
                                                 
68 1938-49, supra note 40, xvii. 
69 Statement of General Policy or Interpretation 3.20 (Feb. 14, 1951), in VINCENT A. KLEINFELD AND 
CHARLES WESLEY DUNN, FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT 1951-1952 385 (1953) [hereinafter 
1951-52]. 
70 Statement of General Policy or Interpretation 3.25 (Aug. 15, 1951), in 1951-52, supra note 69, 388. 
71 Statement of General Policy or Interpretation 3.29 (Feb. 18, 1953), in 1953-57, supra note 67, 310. 
72 See, e.g., VINCENT A. KLEINFELD AND ALAN H. KAPLAN, FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT 
1958-60 223, n.* (1961) [hereinafter 1958-60]. 
73 1953-57, supra note 67, 808.   - 15 - 
"Informal Statements of General Policy or Interpretation," which were "excerpted from 
letters written by responsible officials of the Food and Drug Administration to 
representatives of the affected industries and other persons," in response to inquiries "on 
subjects of general interest," as well as from other sources.
74 This new informal category 
was intended to "serve[] somewhat the same purpose as the former [TC] information 
series which was discontinued in early 1946," but unlike the TCs, these Informal 
Statements of General Policy or Interpretation were published in the Federal Register for 
ease of examination, and were therefore slightly more formal despite their name.
75 Thus, 
by 1957, the FDA had utilized a wide continuum of policymaking tools, from the very 
informal to the very formal: informal communications between industry representatives 
and low-level FDA officials, press releases, TCs, Informal Statements, Formal 
Statements, adjudications, notice-and-comment rulemaking, and formal rulemaking. 
  Formal Statements addressed issues of great political salience and public interest. 
For instance, after a number of women were severely injured after vaginally self-
administering crystals or tablets of potassium permanganate under the erroneous 
impression that doing so would induce abortion,
76 the FDA issued a Formal Statement 
that potassium permanganate would be regarded as misbranded unless it either (1) bore a 
label limiting the chemical for prescription use only or (2) was greatly diluted in an 
                                                 
74 Id.; 1958-60, supra note 72, 223. 
75 1953-57, supra note 67, 808. 
76 "Though all cases experienced fairly immediate per vagina bleeding post self-induced treatment, none 
terminated her pregnancy; instead, the caustic agents burned the vaginal fornix severely; in fact, the vast 
majority of cases delivered liveborn, normal fetuses after attempted abortion." BB Obeng, The Lay Use of 
Potassium Permanganate as an Abortifacient., 22 BR. J. CLIN. PRACT. 465 (1968), abstract available at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/5696512.   - 16 - 
aqueous solution and labeled for external use only.
77 Other Formal Statements aimed to 
reduce misuse of amphetamine and methamphetamine,
78 banned investigational use of 
LSD and other hallucinogenic drugs,
79 and addressed antibiotic use in food-producing 
animals,
80 among other things. It cannot be said, however, that Informal Statements were 
necessarily of lesser significance than Formal Statements. Indeed, Informal Statements 
touched on issues of great importance to many people's lives (e.g., "The term 'kosher' 
should be used only on food products that meet certain religious dietary requirements"),
81 
and occasionally Informal Statements were far more complex, detailed, and lengthy than 
Formal Statements.
82 
  The FDA issued several Statements yearly until 1968, at which point Statements 
were discontinued.
83 Between 1957 and 1968, the FDA issued 85 total Statements, at an 
average of seven per year.
84  
 
E. Guidance Reborn 
  The late 1960s and early 1970s marked a sea change at the FDA. The enlarged 
scope and increased complexity of regulatory legislation passed during this period led 
                                                 
77 Formal Statement of General Policy or Interpretation 3.7 (Aug. 23, 1960), in 1958-60, supra note 72, 
225-26. This Statement was amended on February 3, 1962. VINCENT A. KLEINFELD AND ALAN H. KAPLAN, 
FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT 1961-64 262-63 (1965) [hereinafter 1961-64]. 
78 Formal Statement of General Policy or Interpretation 3.8 (Feb. 10, 1965), in VINCENT A. KLEINFELD AND 
ALAN H. KAPLAN, FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT 1965-68 483 (1973) [hereinafter 1965-68]. 
79 Formal Statement of General Policy or Interpretation 3.47 (July 14, 1966), in 1965-68, supra note 78, 
495-96. 
80 Formal Statement of General Policy or Interpretation 3.25 (Apr. 11, 1968), in 1965-68, supra note 78, 
486. 
81 Informal Statement of General Policy or Interpretation 3.202 (Nov. 30, 1957), in 1953-57, supra note 67, 
809. 
82 Compare Informal Statement of General Policy or Interpretation 3.208 (Nov. 28, 1959), in 1958-60, 
supra note 72, 237-43 with Formal Statement of General Policy or Interpretation 3.5 (Sept. 5, 1958), in 
1958-60, supra note 72, 224. 
83 Compare 1965-68, supra note 78, 483-512 with VINCENT A. KLEINFELD, ALAN H. KAPLAN, & STEPHEN 
A. WEITZMAN, FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT 1969-1974 (1976). 
84 Appendix A, Figure 4, infra.   - 17 - 
both the FDA and administrative agencies generally to disfavor administrative 
adjudication and adopt notice-and-comment rulemaking as their primary engine of 
policymaking.
85 The reasons for this shift were manifold: developing policy on a case-by-
case basis became increasingly costly; agency-made law established through adjudication 
"often proved to be vague or contradictory;" achieving increasingly ambitious regulatory 
goals required "generally applicable standards with precise contours," which are difficult 
to establish in case-specific adjudications; Congress mandated the use of rulemaking in 
certain contexts under newly enacted regulatory statutes; and the Supreme Court clarified 
that resource-intensive trial-type procedures were typically unnecessary for most 
rulemaking proceedings.
86 
  More importantly for our discussion, informal guidance also enjoyed a resurgence 
at the FDA during this time. In 1968, the FDA established the Compliance Policy Guides 
Manual system ("CPGs") "to establish an orderly method for assembling and maintaining 
statements of policy."
87 Like the TCs and Statements, CPGs were culled from 
correspondence with industry and internal policy memoranda, but they also included 
information from precedential judicial decisions, intra-agency multicenter jurisdictional 
agreements, preambles to proposed/final regulations/other documents intended for 
publication in the Federal Register, as well as FDA adjudications.
88 Like their 
predecessors, CPGs represented only the FDA's position of the moment; they were "not 
intended to create or confer any rights, privileges, or benefits on or for any private 
                                                 
85 Carey, supra note 18, at 2-4. 
86 Rakoff, supra note 11, at 163. 
87 Compliance Policy Guides > Introduction, 
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/ComplianceManuals/CompliancePolicyGuidanceManual/ucm116791.htm (last 
visited Jul. 7, 2011) [hereinafter CPG Introduction]. 
88 Id.   - 18 - 
person, but [were] intended for internal guidance."
89 Also like their predecessors, CPGs 
issued during this period covered a wide variety of interesting topics (e.g., labeling 
requirements for allergenic extracts containing glycerin;
90 policies concerning "the 
interstate shipment of biological products for use in medical emergencies;"
91 "Filth from 
Insects, Rodents, and Other Pests in Foods"
92).  CPGs were made available to interested 
parties from the Public Records and Documents Center.
93 The FDA still utilizes CPGs 
today, and now makes them available on the FDA website.
94 
  The FDA also issued guidance "in other documents designated as 'advisory 
opinions,' and in preambles to Federal Register documents."
95 Advisory opinions 
represented the FDA's official but informally issued opinion on more specific factual 
matters than those generally addressed by other guidance documents.
96 However, 
advisory opinions, broadly defined, are difficult to differentiate from other guidance 
documents at the margins; as will be explained in the following sections, this difficulty 
has since caused great ambiguities that plague the agency to this day.
97 
 
F. 1977: Guidance Becomes Binding 
                                                 
89 Id. 
90 CPG § 270.100 Final Container Labels - Allergenic Extracts Containing Glycerin; Reporting Changes 
(originally issued Jul. 1976), available as revised at 
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/ComplianceManuals/CompliancePolicyGuidanceManual/ucm122803.htm. 
91 CPG § 220.100 - IS Shipment Biologicals for Medical Emergency (originally issued Dec. 1977), 
available as revised at 
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/ComplianceManuals/CompliancePolicyGuidanceManual/ucm073860.htm. 
92 CPG § 555.600 Filth from Insects, Rodents, and Other Pests in Foods (originally issued Jan. 1973), 
available as revised at 
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/ComplianceManuals/CompliancePolicyGuidanceManual/ucm074559.htm. 
93 40 Fed. Reg. 40682, 40694 (1975). 
94 Manual of Compliance Policy Guides, 
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/ComplianceManuals/CompliancePolicyGuidanceManual/default.htm. 
[hereinafter Manual of CPGs] 
95 40 Fed. Reg. 40682, 40694 (1975). 
96 O'REILLY, supra note 11, § 4:25 4-93. 
97 See infra Section I.H.3.   - 19 - 
  By 1975, the FDA perceived a need to conduct its operations more systematically, 
publicly, and cohesively.
98 As the FDA became increasingly reliant on guidance 
documents to fulfill its regulatory mandate, it became acutely aware of the increased 
importance of "their [that is, guidance documents'] methods of development, their 
availability, notice of any changes, and an opportunity to participate in their development 
and modification."
99 On September 3rd of that year, the FDA published the following 
statement in a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in the Federal Register: 
The present administrative practices and procedures of the Food and Drug 
Administration are largely uncodified and, to the extent that they are 
included in existing regulations, are spread throughout numerous sections 
in the Code of Federal Regulations and in agency manuals. Many of these 
practices and procedures have been developed over the years on an ad hoc 
basis, to meet immediate needs, without systematically integrating them 
into the agency's overall practices and procedures. Many of the agency's 
practices and procedures have not been written down in any manual or 
regulation. Accordingly, the Commissioner of Food and Drugs has 
concluded that a thorough review of agency practices and procedures 
should be undertaken, and that comprehensive regulations should be 
adopted to codify existing requirements, establish new requirements where 
none currently exist, and conform present regulations so that practices and 
procedures will be applied consistently throughout the agency.
100 
 
  As part of its sweeping reform project, "the FDA promulgated a regulation 
providing that any officially issued advisory opinion or guideline would be binding on 
the agency."
101 In other words, the FDA obligated itself to follow the opinions expressed 
                                                 
98 See generally Peter Barton Hutt, FDA Court Actions & Recent Legal Developments, 39 ASS'N OF FOOD & 
DRUG OFFICIALS Q. BULL. 11 (1975); Peter Barton Hutt, Public Information and Public Participation in 
the Food and Drug Administration, 36 ASS'N OF FOOD & DRUG OFFICIALS Q. BULL. 212 (1972) [hereinafter 
Hutt, Public Info]. 
99 40 Fed. Reg. 40682, 40695 (1975). 
100 40 Fed. Reg. 40682, 40682-83 (1975). 
101 Noah, supra note 11, at 114 (citing 42 Fed. Reg. 4680, 4708-10 (1977) (codified as amended at 21 
C.F.R. §§ 10.85, 10.90 (1997)). The FDA originally tried to finalize these and other procedural reforms 
without public comment, but were rebuffed by the District Court of the District of Columbia, which 
concluded that even though the proposed regulations "were completely procedural in nature, they were so 
comprehensive" that they required notice-and-comment rulemaking to promulgate. Letter from Peter 
Barton Hutt, Senior Counsel, Covington & Burling LLP and Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School, to 
author (July 27, 2011) (on file with author) [hereinafter Letter]; 40 Fed. Reg. 22950, 22950-51 (1975);   - 20 - 
in its own guidance until amended or revoked, unless those opinions arose from informal 
communications with lower-level employees, or if emergency situations required 
deviation from established guidelines.
102 However, official guidance only bound the 
FDA, not regulated entities or courts. In other words, guidance documents established 
safe harbors within which regulated actors could conduct their operations with reasonable 
certainty that they would be adjudged compliant with applicable rules and regulations 
(subject, of course, to the possibility that the FDA could later modify its policy), but did 
not create substantive rules that entities were required to follow.
103 Binding effect was not 
restricted to guidance documents subsequent to its new regulation; the FDA explicitly 
noted that the opinions it previously published in Statements of Policy or Interpretation in 
the Federal Register or issued in TCs, CPGs, and other comparable documents would 
also bind the FDA "unless subsequently repudiated by the agency or overruled by a 
court."
104 The FDA offered the following rationale for this sweeping reform: 
Prior Food and Drug Administration policy has not distinguished between 
formal advisory opinions and informal oral advice and correspondence; as 
a result, confusion and uncertainty has been engendered both within the 
agency and outside as to whether opinions expressed in correspondence or 
orally carry the weight of the agency or only of the individual agency 
employee involved. Absent specific regulations to the contrary, the 
                                                                                                                                                
Gregory M. Fischer, Third Class of Drugs - A Current View, 46 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 583, 614 (1991); 
Am. Coll. of Neuropsychopharmacology v. Weinberger, Civ. No. 75-1187 (D.D.C. 1975). 
102 42 Fed. Reg. 4680, 4708-10 (1977) (codified as amended at 21 C.F.R. §§ 10.85, 10.90 (2011)). 
103 42 Fed. Reg. 4680, 4709 (1977) (codified as amended at 21 C.F.R. §§ 10.85, 10.90 (2011)) ("An 
advisory opinion may be used in administrative or court proceedings to illustrate acceptable and 
unacceptable procedures or standards, but not as a legal requirement . . . A person may rely upon a 
guideline with assurance that it is acceptable to the Food and Drug Administration, or may follow different 
procedures or standards. Where a person chooses to use different procedures or standards, he may, but is in 
no instance required to, discuss the matter in advance with the Food and Drug Administration to prevent 
the expenditure of money and effort on activity that may later be determined to be unacceptable."). See also 
Noah, supra note 11, at 116-18 ("The regulation does nothing more than bind the FDA in the sense that it 
agrees to issue reliable advice about how it interprets the requirements imposed by the statute and 
regulations. Formal advisory opinions and guidelines would not, for instance, give third parties the right to 
object to Agency decisions accepting submissions by a regulated firm that are allegedly inconsistent with 
those opinions or guidelines."). 
104 42 Fed. Reg. 4680, 4709 (1977) (codified as amended at 21 C.F.R. §§ 10.85, 10.90 (2011)).   - 21 - 
statements of a government employee do not bind the government . . . 
Accordingly, because of the lack of any agency regulations on this matter, 
none of the correspondence or oral advice previously issued by the agency 
has had any binding legal effect. In many instances, important agency 
correspondence relating to the legal status of ingredients and products has 
not been compiled or reviewed in any comprehensive or systematic way, 
with the result that few in the agency have known about the existence of 
such correspondence[;] nor has [the public understood] that such 
correspondence has no legal status . . . For this reason, on recent occasions 
the agency has been forced to issue regulations formally withdrawing prior 
opinion letters relating to the food additive and new drug status of 
Products . . . The Commissioner would resolve the present uncertainty by 
the proposal of regulations that would clearly and explicitly recognize the 
difference between the informal opinion of an individual in the agency, 
which represents his best information and advice, and the formal opinion 
of the agency, which represents a position of the Food and Drug 
Administration that is binding and commits the agency to the views 
expressed until they are formally modified or revoked.
105 
 
  The new regulations attempted to precisely define a category of guidance 
documents called "guidelines," as differentiated from advisory opinions, that 
"establish[ed] principles or practices of general applicability [that] d[id] not include 
decisions or advice limited to particular situations," and established procedures for their 
amendment, revocation, and issuance.
106 The FDA also established a formal mechanism 
by which "[a]ny person could request an advisory opinion from the Commissioner with 
respect to any matter of general applicability,"
107 required guidance documents to be 
                                                 
105 40 Fed. Reg. 40682, 40694 (1975). 
106 21 C.F.R. § 10.90(b) (historical version, 1978). 
107 42 Fed. Reg. 4680, 4708 (1977) (codified as amended at 21 C.F.R. §§ 10.85, 10.90 (2011)).   - 22 - 
"included in the public file of guidelines established by the Hearing Clerk,"
108 and 
allowed interested parties to submit comments on advisory opinions.
109 
  These changes was revolutionary. Previously, guidance represented no more than 
the FDA's current thinking at the moment, subject to change with little to no warning.
110 
Henceforth, regulated entities could reasonably place unprecedented reliance on the 
FDA's informal advice, as long as it came in the form of a written document that 
originated with high-level FDA officials.
111 The new system also afforded greater 
opportunities for public participation in the policymaking process. Although the FDA 
refused requests to subject all of its guidance documents to the costly and labor-intensive 
notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures,
112 it gave regulated entities both an 
unprecedented opportunity to submit their views regarding advisory opinions and a 
designated process for requesting guidance on any topic of general interest to industry.
113 
Importantly, proclaiming informal guidance binding did not unduly hinder the FDA's 
flexibility. The process for revoking or amending prior guidance documents and notifying 
                                                 
108 42 Fed. Reg. 4680, 4709 (1977) (codified as amended at 21 C.F.R. §§ 10.85, 10.90 (2011)). However, 
due to resource constraints, the FDA rejected requests to require the publication of all advisory opinions in 
the Federal Register. 42 Fed. Reg. 4680, 4693-94 (1977); 40 Fed. Reg. 40682, 40695 (1975). The FDA 
concluded that its guidance would nevertheless be sufficiently public: "Such advisory opinions may be 
compiled as part of the agency's Compliance Policy Guides manual, or in a separate compilation of 
advisory opinions. The substance of these advisory opinions would undoubtedly be disseminated widely by 
the agency trade associations, and the trade press." 40 Fed. Reg. 40682, 40695 (1975). 
109 42 Fed. Reg. 4680, 4709 (1977) (codified as amended at 21 C.F.R. §§ 10.85, 10.90 (2011)). 
110 See supra Sections I.B-C; I.E. 
111 See Noah, supra note 11, at 114, 116-18. 
112 42 Fed. Reg. 4680, 4694 (1977). 
113 42 Fed. Reg. 4680, 4708-09 (1977) (codified as amended at 21 C.F.R. §§ 10.85, 10.90 (2011)). It should 
be noted, however, that not all commentators view the guidance request process as particularly beneficial 
for industry. "It is axiomatic that the person requesting the agency's advice must be prepared to live with 
any answer received, even an unfavorable one, and that some particularly uncertain areas are best left 
unexplored." O'REILLY, supra note 11, § 4:25 4-95 (citing Kleinfeld, Approach to FDA: Tactics and 
Strategy, in FEDERAL REGULATION OF THE DRUG INDUSTRY (V. Kleinfeld ed. 1972)). Some attorneys' 
views on the process are therefore well summed up by the following pithy quote: "When to write the 
Agency: Practically never." Id.   - 23 - 
interested parties of modifications of agency policy was not particularly onerous.
114 
These changes therefore not only benefited industry to a large extent, they also 
"exemplified the sort of agency self-discipline that courts and commentators" had long 
endorsed for the ever-growing administrative state, and did so without unduly 
constraining the FDA's authority.
115 
 
G. Chevron 
  1984 marked a massive victory for administrative agencies in the United States: 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc.
116 Chevron established 
a two-step test for determining whether an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous 
provision in its organic statute could withstand judicial challenge: 
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it 
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the 
question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at 
issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the 
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously 
expressed intent of Congress.
117 If, however, the court determines 
Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court 
does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be 
necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the 
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the 
question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute.
118 
 
                                                 
114 42 Fed. Reg. 4680, 4709-10 (1977) (codified as amended at 21 C.F.R. §§ 10.85, 10.90 (2011)) ("A 
guideline may be amended or revoked upon approval of the amended guideline or revocation of the 
guideline by the relevant bureau director and publication by the Commissioner in the Federal Register of a 
notice of such amendment or revocation. The notice shall state (i) the title of the guideline, (ii) the subject 
matter it covers, and (iii) the office or individual responsible for maintaining the guideline."). See also 
Noah, supra note 11, at 114. 
115 Noah, supra note 11, at 114. 
116 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
117 To determine whether the statutory text unambiguously addresses the question at issue, courts utilize the 
"traditional tools of statutory construction." Id. at 843 n.9. 
118 Id. at 842-43.   - 24 - 
  Chevron was revolutionary: "the decision has become . . . the undisputed starting 
point for any assessment of the allocation of authority between federal courts and 
administrative agencies,"
119 because Chevron arguably greatly increased the amount of 
deference courts give to agencies' interpretations of their organic statutes.
120 Judicial 
deference is a crucial factor in any agency's ability to fulfill its regulatory objectives, and 
the FDA is no exception: 
One can loosely define deference as the willingness of a court to accept an 
agency's interpretations of a statute or policy over competing 
interpretations offered by regulated persons or public interest groups. 
Once the agency decides the issue, a rigorous “hard look” by a federal 
court might overrule the agency's interpretation of the statute, but a 
deferential review will likely accept the agency's interpretation--and with 
it, the agency's decision regarding issuing the license or rule. Thus, the key 
to any agency's successful defense of its decisions is the willingness of 
federal judges to give deference to its expertise. Indeed, agencies fervently 
seek deference to ensure the enforceability of their policy decisions. If an 
agency does not receive consistent deference from the courts, regulated 
entities will likely deem the agency less potent; in turn, those entities will 
be less likely to respect agency decisions. As with any administrative 
agency, deference is a cornerstone of the FDA's effectiveness. If it were 
not accorded deference, the many hours spent formulating and 
promulgating rules [and policies] would amount to a waste.
121  
 
                                                 
119 Sunstein, supra note 2, at 188. But see Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 596 (2000) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting) (arguing that Chevron was an outgrowth of prior caselaw, rather than a massive change to it). 
120 Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Reason and Reasonableness in Review of Agency Decisions, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 
799, 804 (2010) (citing Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study 
of Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1029-43)); Elizabeth Garrett, Legislating Chevron, 101 MICH. 
L. REV. 2637, 2645 n.35 (2003). But see Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon, 
Not a Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1727, 1739-40 (2010) (summarizing empirical studies suggesting ambiguity regarding whether 
Chevron actually increased judicial deference to agency interpretations). Interestingly, there is reason to 
believe this marked change in administrative law doctrine was unintentional. "One surprise is the absence 
of any evidence in the written record indicating that the Justices realized the full implications of their 
landmark administrative law decision in . . . Chevron. There is no comment in the written exchanges among 
the Justices that reflects any appreciation of the major change in administrative law the decision effected." 
Robert Percival, Environmental Law in the Supreme Court: Highlights from the Marshall Papers, 23 
ENVTL. L. REP. 10606, 10613 (1993). 
121 James T. O'Reilly, Losing Deference in the FDA's Second Century: Judicial Review, Politics, and a 
Diminished Legacy of Expertise, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 939, 941-42 (2008) (internal citations omitted).   - 25 - 
Because rulemaking, adjudication, and guidance regularly require interpretation of 
ambiguous statutory provisions,
122 agency policies survived judicial review at greater 
rates after Chevron.
123 Chevron deference therefore became a sought-after commodity for 
administrative agencies seeking to ensure that their policies would be upheld in court.
124 
  After 1984, the FDA successfully defended several policies issued in informal 
guidance documents from judicial challenge by invoking Chevron deference. For 
instance, in Young v. Community Nutrition Institute,
125 the Supreme Court afforded 
Chevron deference to a policy expressed in an "action level," which the FDA initially 
published as a guidance document in the Federal Register without formal procedures.
126 
In other words, even though the policy was established in a document that neither bound 
regulated entities nor was promulgated with the "force of law," the Supreme Court still 
deferred to the FDA's judgment and gave the agency's policy the Court's imprimatur.
127 
Chevron therefore made informal guidance a powerful weapon for the FDA. 
  Chevron led to victories for the FDA in the lower courts as well. For example, the 
United States District Court of the District of Columbia afforded Chevron deference to an 
FDA policy statement relating to rDNA-engineered foods that interpreted the Generally 
Recognized As Safe ("GRAS") provision of the FD&C Act.
128 Again, this policy 
statement was given deference even though it was not the product of notice-and-comment 
                                                 
122 Jonathan R. Siegel, Guardians of the Background Principles, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 123, 130. 
123 Pojanowski, supra note 120, at 804 (citing Schuck & Elliott, supra note 120, at 1029-43). But see Raso 
& Eskridge, supra note 120, at 1739-40. 
124 O'Reilly, supra note 121, at 941-42. 
125 476 U.S. 974 (1986). 
126 Id. at 976-78 (quoting 46 Fed. Reg. 7448 (1981)) ("On some occasions, the FDA has instead set 'action 
levels' through a less formal process. In setting an action level, the FDA essentially assures food producers 
that it ordinarily will not enforce the general adulteration provisions of the Act against them if the quantity 
of the harmful added substance in their food is less than the quantity specified by the action level."). 
127 See Sunstein, supra note 2, at 208-10. 
128 Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F.Supp.2d 166, 176-179 (D.D.C. 2000).   - 26 - 
rulemaking.
129 While there was some disagreement among courts and commentators 
during this time regarding whether informal documents warranted Chevron deference as 
a general matter,
130 a number of other cases also afforded Chevron deference to FDA 
guidance documents.
131 
  Cases like Chevron and Young at first seemed to suggest that courts would defer 
to almost any reasonable and authoritative interpretation of an ambiguous provision of a 
statute the FDA administers, regardless of the procedures used to formulate the policy 
expressed in that interpretation.
132 Indeed, Chevron "ma[de] no mention of and d[id] not 
appear to have been concerned with whether an interpretation of an administrative agency 
was adopted as part of a formal rulemaking process or not."
133 Such an approach would 
have rendered guidance a tremendously powerful weapon in the FDA's arsenal; the FDA 
could flexibly and inexpensively set new policies in response to changing circumstances 
                                                 
129 Id. at 172-73. 
130 Kevin J. Miller, Welfare and the Minimum Wage: Are Workfare Participants "Employees" Under the 
Fair Labor Standards Act?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 183, 191 n.44 (1999). 
131 See National Pharmaceutical Alliance v. Henney, 47 F.Supp.2d 37 (D.D.C. 1999); Berlex Laboratories, 
Inc. v. FDA, 942 F.Supp. 19 (D.D.C. 1996). See generally Patricia G. Chapman, Has the Chevron Doctrine 
Ran Out of Gas? Senza Ripieni Use of Chevron Deference or the Rule of Lenity, 19 MISS. C. L. REV. 115, 
137 (1998). 
132 Sunstein, supra note 2, at 208-10. "Without pausing to explore the [question of whether Chevron 
deference is warranted for interpretations formulated without formal procedures,] the Court [in Young] 
deferred to the agency and upheld its interpretation." Id. at 208. Young therefore seemed to suggest that the 
Chevron doctrine operates as follows: "Whenever an agency makes an authoritative interpretation of a 
statute that it administers, that interpretation falls under the Chevron framework, unless the agency's self-
interest is so conspicuously at stake that it is implausible to infer a congressional delegation of law-
interpreting power. On this approach, it is necessary only to know whether purported interpreters 
authoritatively speak for the agency itself. If they do, the Chevron framework applies." Id. at 210. As 
explained in greater detail infra Section I.I., however, this interpretation of Chevron was not borne out in 
subsequent cases. See also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 239-261 (2001) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) ("Whereas previously a reasonable agency application of an ambiguous statutory provision had 
to be sustained so long as it represented the agency's authoritative interpretation, henceforth such an 
application can be set aside unless 'it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to 
make rules carrying the force of law,' as by giving an agency 'power to engage in adjudication or notice-
and-comment rulemaking, or ... some other [procedure] indicati[ng] comparable congressional intent,' and 
'the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.'" (citations 
omitted)). 
133 John P.C. Duncan, The Course of Federal Preemption of State Banking Law, 18 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 
221, 266 (1999).   - 27 - 
that would regularly receive deference in judicial proceedings, even though those policies 
did not technically bind regulated entities.  
  That, however, was not to be. As will be described in Section I.I. infra, 
subsequent caselaw greatly reduced the scope of agency interpretations entitled to 
Chevron deference. While this development may have partially assuaged concerns that 
the FDA and other agencies were inappropriately treating non-binding guidance 
documents as if they had binding effect,
134 this relief has come at a high price; it is now 
extremely uncertain which statutory interpretations by administrative agencies receive 
judicial deference and, if so, how much. Before diving into that murky quagmire, 
however, I first turn to a chronologically antecedent but equally confusing set of 
developments. 
 
H. Muddying the Waters 
  In the 1990s, the FDA made a number of decisions that once again radically 
changed its informal guidance regime. As the procedural requirements associated with 
notice-and-comment rulemaking became increasingly stringent over the years,
135 the 
FDA simultaneously radically decreased the number of regulations it adopted annually 
while greatly increasing "the number of FDA-issued documents intended to give 
guidance to the regulated industry but not adopted through public procedures."
136 For the 
first time, informal guidance became the FDA's primary method of policymaking.
137  
                                                 
134 See supra note 11. 
135 See generally Carey, supra note 18, For an excellent yet succinct historical summary of the ossification 
of notice-and-comment rulemaking, see Rakoff, supra note 11, at 164-65. But see O'Connell, supra note 5, 
at 932-36 (arguing "that the procedural costs to rulemaking (from the agency's perspective) are not so high 
as to prohibit considerable rulemaking activity by agencies"). 
136 Rakoff, supra note 11, at 168. 
137 Id. See generally Seiguer and Smith, supra note 12.    - 28 - 
  Around the same time, the FDA rescinded its prior decision to make guidance 
documents binding upon the agency, and promulgated a regulation establishing Good 
Guidance Practices the agency was required to follow when formulating and issuing 
informal guidance. However, in doing so, the FDA created vexing ambiguities that 
persist to this day. 
 
1. Guidance Becomes Non-Binding... Again 
  By 1992, the FDA became increasingly trepidatious about its 1977 decision to 
render its official guidance documents binding on the agency. Citing a perceived need "to 
ensure that its advisory opinion and guideline regulations are consistent with principles of 
estoppel and with sound public policy," the FDA proposed a rule in the Federal Register 
that, when finalized, would render both its past and future guidance documents non-
binding.
138 The FDA insisted, however, "that advisory opinions, while not legally binding 
FDA to a particular course of action, would still represent the agency's best advice on the 
matter at issue at the time they are rendered," and that "guidelines would continue to 
provide to persons dealing with the agency useful information about procedures or 
practices that the agency believes are generally desirable."
139 Previously issued guidance 
documents would remain in effect, but would not bind the agency.
140 
  The FDA stated that one of the reasons for its decision to reverse course on this 
issue was the D.C. Circuit's then-recent decision in Community Nutrition Institute v. 
Young,
141 which "held that the FDA could not cabin its prosecutorial discretion by 
                                                 
138 57 Fed. Reg. 47314, 47314 (1992). 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 47315. 
141 818 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1987); 57 Fed. Reg. 47314, 47315 (1992).   - 29 - 
promising not to enforce [certain provisions] of the FD&C Act in certain circumstances, 
unless it had issued an appropriate regulation after notice-and-comment rulemaking."
142 
The FDA concluded from this that it was unlawful for the agency to tie its hands by 
issuing binding guidance documents that could preclude it from fully enforcing the 
Act.
143 The FDA likewise feared that its regulations to that effect were "inconsistent with 
the intent of the notice and comment provisions of the APA."
144 After the FDA released 
its proposed rule, some scholars questioned whether these conclusions were doctrinally 
correct, and accused the FDA of "undermin[ing] a sensible a legally permissible system" 
"for no good reason."
145 A number of people also submitted comments on the FDA's 
proposed change during the notice-and-comment process, requesting that the FDA keep 
guidance binding.
146 The FDA nevertheless maintained that precedent and good policy 
mandated that guidance once again be rendered non-binding, and stated that most 
participants who submitted comments during the rulemaking process "agreed that 
guidance documents should not be binding."
147 As a result, the change went into effect.
148 
The FDA accordingly deleted the entire regulatory provision relating to guidelines, a type 
of informal guidance that purportedly "establish[es] principles or practices of general 
applicability and do[es] not include decisions or advice on particular situations," to make 
room for the developments described below.
149  
 
                                                 
142 Noah, supra note 11, at 137 (citing CNI, 818 F.2d at 948-49). 
143 57 Fed. Reg. 47314, 47315 (1992). 
144 Id. 
145 See generally Noah, supra note 11. 
146 62 Fed. Reg. 8961, 8962-63 (1997). 
147 Id. 
148 Id. (codified as amended at 21 C.F.R. § 10.115 (2011)).  
149 Compare 21 C.F.R. § 10.90(b) (Historical Version, 2000) with 21 C.F.R. § 10.90(b) (Historical Version, 
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2. Good Guidance Practices 
  Around the same time, the FDA further increased the formality of guidance in 
other respects by promulgating regulations codifying its "policies and procedures for 
developing, issuing, and using guidance documents" in a document entitled Good 
Guidance Practices ("GGPs").
150 This development was spurred by a petition issued by 
the Indiana Medical Devices Manufacturers Council, who "requested that FDA control 
the initiation, development, and issuance of guidance documents by written procedures 
that assure the appropriate level of meaningful public participation,"
151 as well as by 
concerns from courts and other industry players that the guidance process was being 
"subverted."
152 Agreeing "that public participation generally benefits the guidance 
document development process," and emphasizing "the importance of communicating 
more clearly to its employees and to the public the [newly] nonbinding nature of 
guidance documents," the FDA initiated a notice-and-comment rulemaking proceeding 
and solicited recommendations for improving its guidance procedures.
153 In doing so, the 
FDA hoped to 
(1) Provide assistance to the regulated industry by clarifying requirements 
that have been imposed by Congress or issued in regulations by FDA and 
by explaining how industry may comply with those statutory and 
regulatory requirements and (2) provide specific review and enforcement 
approaches to help ensure that FDA's employees implement the agency's 
mandate in an effective, fair, and consistent manner.
154  
 
                                                 
150 21 C.F.R. § 10.115 (2011). 
151 62 Fed. Reg. 8961, 8961 (1997). 
152 Rakoff, supra note 11, at 168. 
153 61 Fed. Reg. 9181, 9181 (1996). 
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The FDA's proposal received the imprimatur of Congress, and was codified in the Food 
and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 ("FDAMA").
155 The GGPs 
officially went into effect shortly after the turn of the millennium, and created mandatory 
guidance procedures that remain in place today.
156 
  As codified in 21 C.F.R. § 10.115, the GGPs establish two tiers of guidance. The 
first category, dubbed "Level 1 guidance documents," "include guidance documents that: 
(i) Set forth initial interpretations of statutory or regulatory requirements; (ii) Set forth 
changes in interpretation or policy that are of more than a minor nature; (iii) Include 
complex scientific issues; or (iv) Cover highly controversial issues."
157 Any guidance 
documents that do not fall within this category, including "guidance documents that set 
forth existing practices or minor changes in interpretation or policy," are designated as 
"Level 2 guidance documents."
158 The procedures for issuing a Level 1 guidance 
document are similar to, but less rigorous than, the requirements for informal rulemaking 
established in the Administrative Procedure Act:
159 the FDA must publish a notice in the 
Federal Register after a draft guidance is available, make its draft guidance available on 
the Internet and in hard copy, and invite and review comments on the proposed 
                                                 
155 Pub. L. No. 105-115, §405, 111 Stat. 2296, 2368-69 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 371(h) (1997)). "Following 
the FDA's publication of its original GGP, Congress then mandated by law certain aspects of the 1997 GGP 
document in the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA). In FDAMA, 
Congress detailed basic elements of good guidance practices and required the FDA to issue new GGP as 
regulations. In the legislative history of FDAMA, Congress expressed particular concern about public 
knowledge of, and access to, FDA guidance documents; the lack of a systematic process for adopting 
guidance documents and for allowing public input; and inconsistency in the use of guidance documents." 
Paul R. Noe & John D. Graham, Due Process and Management for Guidance Documents: Good 
Governance Long Overdue, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 103, 107 (2008) (citations omitted). 
156 21 C.F.R. § 10.115 (historical version, 2001); 21 C.F.R. § 10.115 (2011). 
157 21 C.F.R. § 10.115(c)(1) (2011). 
158 Id. § 10.115(c)(2). 
159 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2011); Hunnicutt, supra note 2, at 180; Michael Jon Andersen, Bound Guidance: 
FDA Rulemaking for Off-Label Pharmaceutical Drug Marketing, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 531, 536-37 
(2010). See also 65 Fed. Reg. 56468, 56473 (2000) (differentiating informal guidance from notice-and-
comment rulemaking).   - 32 - 
guidance.
160 Unlike rules promulgated through notice-and-comment, however, Level 1 
guidance does not require the agency to respond to significant comments it receives;
161 
the FDA need only "review" submitted comments.
162 This frees the FDA from one of the 
major procedural burdens associated with notice-and-comment rulemaking.
163 
  Level 2 guidance documents also require procedures that resemble notice-and-
comment,
164 but in turn are less rigorous than the procedures for Level 1 documents. 
Unlike Level 1 documents, the FDA need not publish notice in the Federal Register for 
Level 2 documents; it only need make the document available on the internet and in hard 
copy.
165 More importantly, whereas the FDA may not begin implementation of a Level 1 
document until interested parties have had an opportunity for comment, the FDA may 
implement Level 2 documents the instant they are issued, as long as the agency is 
receptive to any comments it may subsequently receive.
166 
  Interested parties may, at any time, submit comments requesting that specific 
guidances be revised or withdrawn.
167 Interested parties may likewise suggest topics for 
new guidance documents
168 and "submit drafts of proposed guidance documents for FDA 
                                                 
160 21 C.F.R. § 10.115(g)(1)-(3) (2011). 
161 Mendelson, supra note 10, at 425-26. See also United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 
240, 252-253 (1977). Some have viewed this aspect of the GGPs quite negatively. Seiguer and Smith, 
supra note 12, at 30 (noting that some industry representatives believe that "even though FDA accepts 
comments from the public, . . . it is very unusual for FDA to actually change its position or incorporate any 
of the feedback into the guidance"). 
162 21 C.F.R. § 10.115(g)(1)(iv)(A) (2011). 
163 See Nova Scotia, 568 F.2d at 252-253 (holding a regulation invalid for failing to respond to significant 
comments, inter alia). 
164 21 C.F.R. § 10.115(g)(4) (2011). 
165 Compare id. § 10.115(g)(4)(i) with id. § 10.115(g)(1). 
166 Compare id. § 10.115(g)(4)(i) with id. § 10.115(g)(1). See also Andersen, supra note 159, at 537. 
167 21 C.F.R. §§ 10.115(g)(5), (f)(4) (2011). 
168 Id. § 10.115(f)(2).   - 33 - 
to consider."
169 Finally, guidance documents must be "approved by appropriate senior 
FDA officials" to be validly issued.
170 
  The GGPs explicitly state that guidance documents "do not legally bind the public 
or FDA."
171 To that end, guidance documents must not include mandatory language, 
including words like “shall,” “must,” “required,” or “requirement,” unless those words 
are used "to describe a statutory or regulatory requirement."
172 Even though guidance 
documents technically no longer "legally bind FDA, they represent the agency's current 
thinking. Therefore, FDA employees may depart from guidance documents only with 
appropriate justification and supervisory concurrence."
173 Failure to obtain such approval 
amounts to a regulatory violation. Moreover, even though the FDA is not rigidly bound 
by the substance of its guidance documents, it is bound by the procedural requirements of 
the GGPs because they are enshrined in duly-promulgated regulations and statutory 
law.
174 Thus, "[t]he agency may not use documents or other means of communication that 
are excluded from the definition of guidance document to informally communicate new 
or different regulatory expectations to a broad public audience for the first time."
175 To 
that end, 21 C.F.R. § 10.115 also establishes procedures to ensure that FDA employees 
and officials are complying with GGP requirements.
176 
  The GGPs also aimed to increase regulatory clarity by mandating that all 
guidance documents "[i]dentify the activity to which and the people to whom the 
                                                 
169 Id. § 10.115(f)(3). 
170 Id. § 10.115(j). 
171 Id. § 10.115(d)(1). 
172 Id. § 10.115(i)(2). 
173 Id. § 10.115(d)(3). But see Hunnicutt, supra note 2, at 182-83 (criticizing this provision's lack of clarity). 
174 Supra notes 155-156. 
175 21 C.F.R. § 10.115(e) (2011). 
176 Id. §§ 10.115(l), (o).   - 34 - 
document applies,"
177 and also identify on the face of the document that the policy 
constitutes non-binding guidance.
178 
  Thus, the FDA's activity leading up to the turn of the millennium may best be 
described as taking two steps forward and one step back in terms of proceduralization: 
guidance was no longer binding on the agency, but the agency exhibited much greater 
self-discipline in the guidance issuance process. The GGPs provided for unprecedented 
public participation in the process of making, revising, and withdrawing informal 
guidance documents, to the benefit of industry. 
 
3. Confusion Confounded 
  The FDA's aim in these reforms appears to have been to render all forms of 
informal guidance, including "formal advisory opinions and guidelines," non-binding 
upon the agency, while allowing for greater public participation and clarity in the 
policymaking process.
179 However, it is not altogether clear that the FDA fully achieved 
all of these goals. At the close of rulemaking, two separate and arguably conflicting 
provisions regarding guidance existed in the Code of Federal Regulations. The new 
GGPs explicitly provided that a large subset of informal guidance would no longer be 
considered binding,
180 and the FDA removed its former provision on "guidelines" to the 
contrary from the Code of Federal Regulations.
181 However, the FDA left a different 
regulation that dealt with a subset of guidance documents labeled "advisory opinions" 
largely unmodified from the 1977 regulations that rendered those documents binding in 
                                                 
177 Id. § 10.115(i)(iii). 
178 Id. §§ 10.115(i)(i), (i)(iv). 
179 Noah, supra note 11, at 114; 57 Fed. Reg. 47314, 47314 (1992); 61 Fed. Reg. 9181, 9181 (1996). 
180 21 C.F.R. § 10.115 (historical version, 2001). 
181 Compare 21 C.F.R. § 10.90(b) (historical version, 1978) with 21 C.F.R. § 10.90(b) (2011).   - 35 - 
the first place.
182 Under these regulations, "advisory opinions" are defined as a broad 
category including not only "documents specifically identified as advisory opinions," but 
also TCs, CPGs, and "[a]ny portion of a Federal Register notice other than the text of a 
proposed or final regulation."
183 (I shall hereinafter use the umbrella term "advisory 
opinions" to refer to this entire category, rather than the very small subset of FDA 
documents explicitly identified as advisory opinions per se.)
184 Thus, "the agency has not 
implemented aspects of its 1992 proposal that would have eliminated the binding effect 
of its prior advisory opinions."
185 As a result, a validly promulgated regulation that binds 
the FDA to its advisory opinions remains on the books. Oddly, the FDA drafted and 
published a proposed amendment that would have rendered advisory opinions non-
binding, but did not finalize it in the Code of Federal Regulations, for reasons that are not 
readily apparent.
186 This is bizarre, given the FDA's previously stated intention "that 
                                                 
182 Compare 42 Fed. Reg. 4680, 4708-09 (1977) with 21 C.F.R. § 10.85 (historical version, 2001) ("An 
advisory opinion represents the formal position of FDA on a matter and except as provided in paragraph (f) 
of this section, obligates the agency to follow it until it is amended or revoked. The Commissioner may not 
recommend legal action against a person or product with respect to an action taken in conformity with an 
advisory opinion which has not been amended or revoked."). 
183 21 C.F.R. § 10.85(d) (2011). 
184 "FDA issues virtually no advisory opinions of the type described in [21 C.F.R. § 10.85(a)] . . . Most 
documents that have the same status as an advisory opinion . . . fall within the preambles to proposed or 
final regulations, the compliance policy guides, and the other items identified in that subsection. 
Considering the number of Federal Register preambles, that is undoubtedly by far the greatest, and most 
important, source of statements that have the status of an advisory opinion." Letter, supra note 101. 
185 Barbara J. Evans & Eric M. Meslin, Encouraging Translational Research Through Harmonization of 
FDA and Common Rule Informed Consent Requirements for Research with Banked Specimens, 27 J. 
LEGAL MED. 119, 157 n.118 (2006). 
186 57 Fed. Reg. 47314, 47317 (1992) ("An advisory opinion represents the best advice of FDA on a matter 
at the time of its issuance. However, an advisory opinion does not bind the agency, and it does not create or 
confer any rights, privileges, or benefits for or on any person." (emphasis added)). The FDA mentioned the 
proposed provision several years later, but did not give much useful information for resolving the paradox 
at issue: "In the Federal Register of October 15, 1992 . . . FDA proposed to amend §§10.85 and 10.90, 
which address advisory opinions and guidelines, to delete the provisions that obligate the agency to follow 
advisory opinions and guidelines until they are amended or revoked (except in unusual situations involving 
immediate and significant danger to health). As set forth in the proposed rule, those provisions appear to be 
inconsistent with the general principle that Federal agencies may not be estopped from enforcing the law. 
Although FDA has not yet issued a final rule, the agency plans to make final decisions on the 1992 
proposal under that rulemaking." 61 Fed. Reg. 9181, 9183 n.1 (1996) (internal citations omitted). In a 
subsequent volume of the Federal Register, the FDA perfunctorily responded to a comment requesting an   - 36 - 
guidelines have the same legal status as advisory opinions."
187 Nevertheless, at the close 
of rulemaking, there were, and still are,
188 two distinct categories of informal guidance on 
the books: "advisory opinions," which purport to bind the FDA, and "guidance 
documents," which do not. 
  This bipartite structure has resulted in ambiguity and uncertainty regarding which 
policies bind the FDA, if any.
189 Although advisory opinions and guidance documents 
may be differentiated in the abstract - advisory opinions typically cover more specific 
factual matters, whereas guidance usually creates broader, more general policies
190 - 
                                                                                                                                                
explanation of how the GGPs affected the status of advisory opinions: "We issue advisory opinions under § 
10.85. We anticipate modifying § 10.85 and explaining the effect of § 10.115 on previously issued advisory 
opinions in a separate rulemaking effort. As such, the comment is outside the scope of this rulemaking." 65 
Fed. Reg. 56468, 56474 (2000). This rulemaking never took place, and the proposed amendment was never 
unearthed. See infra note 200. 
187 57 Fed. Reg. 47314, 47314 (1992). 
188 Compare 21 C.F.R. § 10.85 (historical version, 2001) with 21 C.F.R. § 10.85 (2011). 
189 Telephone Interview with Peter Barton Hutt, Senior Counsel, Covington & Burling LLP, Former Chief 
Counsel for the Food and Drug Administration (July 8, 2011) (on file with author) [hereinafter Telephone 
Interview]. For an example of this confusion in the academic literature, compare Rebecca M. Bratspies, 
Glowing in the Dark: How America's First Transgenic Animal Escaped Regulation, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & 
TECH. 457, 476 n.78 (2005) (arguing that a particular document was an advisory opinion that bound the 
FDA) with Lars Noah, Managing Biotechnology's [R]evolution: Has Guarded Enthusiasm Become Benign 
Neglect?, 11 VA. J.L. & TECH 4, 63 n.233 (2006) (arguing the opposite); see also Drew L. Kershen, Health 
and Food Safety: The Benefits of BT-Corn, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 197, 212 n.98 (2006) (assuming the 
FDA's proposal regarding advisory opinions had been finalized); Margaret Gilhooley, The Administrative 
Conference and the Progress of Food and Drug Reform, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 129, 144 (1998) (same); 
O'REILLY, supra note 11 § 4:24 4-88-92 (placing CPGs in the "FDA guidance documents" section rather 
than the "advisory opinions" section, despite their status as advisory opinions under 21 C.F.R. § 10.85). See 
also Hunnicutt, supra note 2, at 184-85 (arguing that the GGPs insufficiently specify which types of 
nonlegislative rules constitute non-binding "guidance documents"). 
190 O'REILLY, supra note 11 § 4:25 4-93 ("Formal FDA pronouncements on specific sets of facts are 
advisory opinions . . . [they are] rarer and more weighty than a guideline, more specific, and more 
binding."); Telephone Interview, supra note 189. See also 21 C.F.R. § 10.115(b) (2011) ("What is a 
guidance document? (1) Guidance documents are documents prepared for FDA staff, applicants/sponsors, 
and the public that describe the agency's interpretation of or policy on a regulatory issue. (2) Guidance 
documents include, but are not limited to, documents that relate to: The design, production, labeling, 
promotion, manufacturing, and testing of regulated products; the processing, content, and evaluation or 
approval of submissions; and inspection and enforcement policies. (3) Guidance documents do not include: 
Documents relating to internal FDA procedures, agency reports, general information documents provided 
to consumers or health professionals, speeches, journal articles and editorials, media interviews, press 
materials, warning letters, memoranda of understanding, or other communications directed to individual 
persons or firms."); 21 C.F.R. § 10.85(d) (2011) (A statement of policy or interpretation made in the 
following documents, unless subsequently repudiated by the agency or overruled by a court, will constitute 
an advisory opinion: (1) Any portion of a Federal Register notice other than the text of a proposed or final   - 37 - 
distinguishing the two in practice is not always simple, especially at the margins. For one, 
the applicable regulations do not specify where on the continuum of breadth of 
applicability advisory opinions end and guidance documents begin. In fact, 21 C.F.R. § 
10.85(a)(2)(iv) suggests that advisory opinions should only be issued on "policy issue[s] 
of broad applicability," even though advisory opinions purport to be less broad than 
guidance documents.
191 To compound the confusion, some CPGs, which are categorized 
as advisory opinions under 21 C.F.R. § 10.85(d)
192 and therefore "obligate[] the agency to 
follow [them] until [they are] amended or revoked,"
193 nonetheless are often labeled by 
the FDA with disclaimers that suggest the policy is non-binding.
194 The FDA likewise 
                                                                                                                                                
regulation, e.g., a notice to manufacturers or a preamble to a proposed or final regulation. (2) Trade 
Correspondence (T.C. Nos. 1–431 and 1A–8A) issued by FDA between 1938 and 1946. (3) Compliance 
policy guides issued by FDA beginning in 1968 and codified in the Compliance Policy Guides manual. (4) 
Other documents specifically identified as advisory opinions, e.g., advisory opinions on the performance 
standard for diagnostic X-ray systems, issued before July 1, 1975, and filed in a permanent public file for 
prior advisory opinions maintained by the Division of Freedom of Information (ELEM–1029)."). 
191 21 C.F.R. § 10.85(a)(2)(iv) (2011) (emphasis added). See also Telephone Interview, supra note 189. See 
also, e.g., 67 Fed. Reg. 77498, 77499 (2002) ("An advisory opinion represents the formal position of FDA 
on a matter of general applicability" (emphasis added)). 
192 "A statement of policy or interpretation made in the following documents, unless subsequently 
repudiated by the agency or overruled by a court, will constitute an advisory opinion: . . . (3) Compliance 
policy guides issued by FDA beginning in 1968 and codified in the Compliance Policy Guides manual." 21 
C.F.R. § 10.85(d) (2011) (emphasis added). 
193 Id. § 10.85(e) (2011). 
194 See, e.g., CPG § 500.500 Guidance Levels for 3-MCPD(3-chloro-1,2-propanediol) in Acid-Hydrolyzed 
Protein and Asian-Style Sauces (Mar. 14, 2008), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/ComplianceManuals/CompliancePolicyGuidanceManual/ucm074419.htm 
("This Compliance Policy Guide represents the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA's) current thinking 
on this topic. It does not create or confer any rights for or on any person and does not operate to bind FDA 
or the public." (emphasis added)); CPG § 280.100 - Stability Requirements - Licensed In Vitro Diagnostic 
Products (Aug. 14, 2000), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/ComplianceManuals/CompliancePolicyGuidanceManual/ucm073881.htm 
(same); CPG § 490.100 Process Validation Requirements for Drug Products and Active Pharmaceutical 
Ingredients Subject to Pre-Market Approval (revised Mar. 12, 2004), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/ComplianceManuals/CompliancePolicyGuidanceManual/ucm074411.htm 
(same); CPG § 110.100 Certification for Exports (revised Apr. 14, 2000), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/ComplianceManuals/CompliancePolicyGuidanceManual/ucm073830.htm 
(describing the document as both a "CPG" and a "guidance document"). Many similar documents may be 
found at Manual of CPGs, supra note 94. The Office of Management and Budget, in a document intended 
"to clarify what guidance is allowed to be issued by federal agencies under the Administrative Procedure 
Act," also categorized "compliance guides" as "guidance documents," which would presumably be non-
binding. Ian J. Kellogg, Prescription for a Cure: Does the FDA's Draft Guidance Adequately Manage 
Advisory Committee Members' Conflicts of Interest?, 19 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 300, 315-16 (2008) (citing   - 38 - 
mixes guidance documents and compliance guides together under the single heading 
"Guidance Documents" on its website.
195 More importantly, the GGPs mandate that  
The agency may not use documents or other means of communication that 
are excluded from the definition of guidance document to informally 
communicate new or different regulatory expectations to a broad public 
audience for the first time. These GGP's must be followed whenever 
regulatory expectations that are not readily apparent from the statute or 
regulations are first communicated to a broad public audience.
196  
 
If "advisory opinions" form a separate and distinct category from "guidance documents," 
as the Code of Federal Regulations suggests, then it appears that the FDA violates its own 
duly promulgated regulations when it uses advisory opinions, such as CPGs, to create 
broadly applicable policies. While many advisory opinions do not violate this provision 
because they address specific, individualized concerns, some advisory opinions do indeed 
"informally communicate new or different regulatory expectations to a broad public 
audience for the first time" and are therefore of questionable validity.
197 
                                                                                                                                                
OMB Bulletin, Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices, 72 Fed. Reg. 3432, 3434 (Jan 25, 
2007)). This further exacerbates the confusion. 
195 See Guidance Documents, 
http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/GuidanceDocuments/default.htm 
(last visited Jul. 18, 2011) [hereinafter Guidance Documents]. 
196 21 C.F.R. § 10.115(e) (2011). 
197 See CPG § 100.550 Status and Responsibilities of Contract Sterilizers Engaged in the Sterilization of 
Drugs and Devices (revised Oct. 3, 2006), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/ComplianceManuals/CompliancePolicyGuidanceManual/ucm073824.htm 
(providing new or different regulatory expectations to all contract sterilizers of all drugs and devices). Note 
that although CPGs count as binding advisory opinions under 21 C.F.R. § 10.85, this CPG is preceded by a 
disclaimer that it "does not operate to bind FDA." Id. Also note that these revisions establishing new 
regulatory expectations occurred several years after October 19, 2000, the effective date for the GGPs, and 
are therefore subject to its restrictions against using policymaking tools other than guidance documents to 
informally communicate regulatory expectations. See, e.g., 65 Fed. Reg. 56468, 56468 (2000). For similar 
examples, see also CPG § 100.700 GWQAP Pre-Award Evaluation - Inadequate Information to Evaluate 
Prospective Supplier (revised Apr. 25, 2005), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/ComplianceManuals/CompliancePolicyGuidanceManual/ucm073826.htm; CPG 
§ 110.300 Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness 
and Response Act of 2002 (issued Dec. 2003), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/ComplianceManuals/CompliancePolicyGuidanceManual/ucm122876.htm; CPG 
§ 110.310 Prior Notice of Imported Food Under the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness 
and Response Act of 2002: Compliance Policy Guide, Guidance for FDA and CBP Staff (May 2009), 
available at   - 39 - 
  This confusing state of affairs has not escaped the eye of industry. During the 
GGP rulemaking proceeding, one commenter requested that the FDA "clarify the status 
of advisory opinions and determine whether they are guidance documents."
198 The FDA's 
response was perfunctory: "We issue advisory opinions under § 10.85. We anticipate 
modifying § 10.85 and explaining the effect of § 10.115 on previously issued advisory 
opinions in a separate rulemaking effort. As such, the comment is outside the scope of 
this rulemaking."
199 However, it does not appear that this separate rulemaking effort ever 
occurred, and there is no sign that it will be conducted in the near future.
200 
  Thus, it is uncertain whether advisory opinions that are labeled as non-binding 
"guidance" do, in fact, bind the FDA. I argue that they do, despite the FDA's repeated 
assertions to the contrary in the preambles to its CPGs. Consider the following 
hypothetical situation: a high-ranking FDA official departs from a policy established in 
one of the aforementioned CPGs that are defined as advisory opinions under FDA 
regulations, yet disclaim binding effect in its introductory text. The FDA has not 
amended or revoked this CPG, and there is no "immediate and significant danger to 
health" that demands noncompliance with the CPG; the CPG is therefore fully valid and 
effective.
201 This departure is likely unlawful. 21 C.F.R. § 10.85 (binding advisory 
opinions) and 21 C.F.R. § 10.115 (non-binding guidance documents) are both duly 
                                                                                                                                                
http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/GuidanceDocuments/FoodDefensea
ndEmergencyResponse/ucm153055.htm.  
198 65 Fed. Reg. 56468, 56474 (2000). 
199 Id. 
200 § 10.85 has not changed since the FDA announced that the agency anticipated modifying it. Compare 21 
C.F.R. § 10.85 (historical version, 2001) with 21 C.F.R. § 10.85 (2011). Furthermore, an examination of all 
Federal Register documents that cite 21 C.F.R. § 10.85 obtained using the "KeyCite Citing References" 
function on Westlaw on July 9, 2011 revealed no sign that the FDA has any current intention of 
undertaking this rulemaking process. 
201 See 21 C.F.R. § 10.85(f) (2011).   - 40 - 
promulgated regulations that are actively in force. The FDA may not ignore them,
202 and 
a court would almost certainly interpret the regulatory scheme to give effect to both 
provisions.
203 Thus, if a regulated entity were to challenge the FDA's policy reversal in a 
judicial proceeding, the court could deem the FDA's departure from a binding policy to 
be "not in accordance with law" under the Administrative Procedure Act, and could 
therefore "hold unlawful and set aside" the FDA's decision.
204  
  Although agencies' interpretations of ambiguous provisions in their own 
regulations are entitled to deference,
205 agencies are not permitted to amend or revoke 
their own regulations via informal guidance documents that have not passed through the 
notice-and-comment rulemaking process.
206 Advisory opinions that disclaim binding 
effect appear to do just that: they contradict the plain text of 21 C.F.R. § 10.85(e) that 
clearly indicates that the FDA is obligated to follow its own advisory opinions until they 
have been officially amended or revoked. Thus, the FDA should not operate under the 
assumption that all of its informal guidance documents are non-binding, or that it can 
                                                 
202 "An agency must follow its own regulations until they are validly amended or rescinded." PETER L. 
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206 If a guidance document "effectively amend[s]" or "contradict[s] the meaning of" a rule promulgated 
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through notice-and-comment rulemaking to have effect. Raso, supra note 5, at 788-90 (citing Am. Mining 
Cong. v. MSHA, 995 F.2d 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Hemp Indus. Ass'n v. DEA, 333 F.3d 1082, 1087-91 (9th 
Cir. 2003); Alaska Prof'l Hunters Ass'n v. FAA, 177 F.3d 1030, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).   - 41 - 
override its own duly enacted regulations simply by including disclaimers of binding 
effect in its advisory opinions. 
  Likewise, as mentioned previously, 21 C.F.R. § 10.115(e) prohibits using types of 
informal guidance that fall outside the definition of "guidance documents" to create 
broadly applicable policies. 21 C.F.R. § 10.115, like 21 C.F.R. § 10.85, is also a legally 
binding regulation, passed through the notice-and-comment rulemaking process. 
Therefore, if the FDA were to point to a policy established in an advisory opinion "to 
illustrate acceptable and unacceptable procedures or standards" in an administrative or 
court proceeding, as is contemplated by 21 C.F.R. § 10.85(j), a regulated party would 
likely be able to successfully challenge that policy if it is a broadly applicable policy 
formulated in derogation of 21 C.F.R. § 10.115(e). This would further hamper the FDA's 
enforcement power and exacerbate litigation costs. 
  Moreover, if an advisory opinion establishes a broadly applicable policy that "(i) 
Set[s] forth initial interpretations of statutory or regulatory requirements; (ii) Set[s] forth 
changes in interpretation or policy that are of more than a minor nature; (iii) Include[s] 
complex scientific issues; or (iv) Cover[s] highly controversial issues," then a regulated 
party could likely successfully challenge the policy in an enforcement proceeding as 
noncompliant with the mandatory procedures for Level 1 guidance documents.
207 
  My conclusion that advisory opinions remain binding is very tentative, because an 
additional wrinkle remains: some aspects of the GGPs, including those that render 
guidance documents non-binding upon the agency, were enacted into the Food and Drug 
Administration Modernization Act of 1997.
208 Just as an informal guidance document 
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cannot amend or revoke a regulation duly promulgated through notice-and-comment 
rulemaking, an administrative regulation cannot trump a congressional statute. Thus, 
whether binding advisory opinions survived the 1997 Act depends on the definition of 
"guidance documents" in the statute that renders those types of documents non-binding. 
If "guidance documents" refers to all forms of informal guidance, including advisory 
opinions, then advisory opinions will not bind the FDA. If, however, "guidance 
documents" is a term of art that refers to policies of broad applicability that do not 
include advisory opinions, then the advisory opinions would bind the FDA. I personally 
think the latter definition is more likely, for the following reasons: Congress took this 
section of the Act wholesale from the FDA's proposed GGPs, and thus arguably adopted 
the FDA's definitions of the terms within. Because the FDA promulgated regulations on 
"guidance documents" without modifying or deleting their regulatory provisions on 
"advisory opinions" or proclaiming them overruled, it is likely that those two terms are 
conceptually distinct, albeit perhaps overlapping at the margins. Moreover, the FDA 
considered, but did not ultimately promulgate, a regulation that would have made 
"guidance documents" a subcategory of advisory opinions;
209 if "guidance documents" 
was an umbrella term that included advisory opinions, this proposal would make no 
sense. This further indicates that the two categories are separate and distinct. It therefore 
appears that Congress only meant to render guidance documents, and not advisory 
opinions, non-binding on the FDA. 
                                                 
209 65 Fed. Reg. 7321, 7328 (2000) ("In 21 CFR part 10, remove the words 'guideline' and 'guidelines' 
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respectively, in the following places: . . . Section 10.85(d)(5)"). 21 C.F.R. § 10.85(d) is the subsection that 
lists various documents that count as advisory opinions, such as TCs and CPGs.   - 43 - 
  Then again, the opposite conclusion is also plausible. Thus, it is anyone's guess 
which informal guidance documents bind the FDA, if any. Put simply, the doctrine 
regarding whether and which informal guidance documents bind the FDA is a mess, and 
someone - whether it be the FDA, Congress, or the courts - should step in and clarify it.  
  That said, the practical effect of the difference between binding advisory opinions 
and non-binding guidance documents should not be overstated. "Binding" and "non-
binding" are relative terms. The FDA is free to amend or revoke any of its informal 
guidance, regardless of whether or not those documents have binding effect, without 
having to go through particularly costly or time-consuming procedures.
210 In other words, 
the cost of departing from "binding" guidance is not much greater than that of departing 
from non-binding guidance. Moreover, the FDA is free to disregard a "binding" advisory 
opinion "[i]n unusual situations involving an immediate and significant danger to health" 
with the Commissioner's approval,
211 and FDA employees may depart from "non-
binding" guidance documents "only with appropriate justification and supervisory 
concurrence."
212 Thus, to industry, there may be little practical difference between the 
two in most cases.  
  The consequences for the FDA could conceivably be massive, however. As 
explained previously, if and when a high-level FDA official departs from a policy set 
forth in a binding advisory opinion under the mistaken impression that the document is 
actually non-binding, without formally amending or revoking that advisory opinion, the 
FDA will probably be unable to successfully defend its policy reversal from judicial 
challenge. This could be costly for the agency and could make it difficult for the FDA to 
                                                 
210 See 21 C.F.R. §§ 10.85(g), 10.115(k) (2011).  
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fulfill its regulatory objectives. Also, as stated earlier, the same would be true if and when 
the FDA improperly establishes broad policies in advisory opinions. Additionally, as will 
be described in greater detail infra, the confusion regarding the binding status of advisory 
opinions could affect the degree of deference the judiciary grants to the FDA's 
interpretations of ambiguous provisions of its organic statute.  
  Moreover, some commentators have argued that the FDA is increasingly in 
danger of losing its strong reputation as a scientifically expert, depoliticized agency.
213 If 
these criticisms are correct, the FDA cannot afford looking like an agency that refuses to 
play by its own rules, lest it risk losing even further support from the executive branch, 
Congress, the judiciary, industry, and the public. The FDA must clearly specify which 
guidance is binding on the agency and which is not, and it must follow those 
determinations accordingly. 
 
I. And Behold, a Pale Horse, and His Name That Sat on Him was Mead, and Barnhart 
Followed With Him 
  Beginning in 2000, the Supreme Court decided three cases that severely 
threatened the FDA's ability to rely on guidance as its principal policymaking tool and 
introduced great uncertainty and confusion into the doctrine of judicial review of agency 
statutory interpretations: Christensen, Mead, and Barnhart. Although these cases 
involved the scope of the Chevron framework, they did not address how the two-step 
Chevron inquiry proceeds; rather, they dealt with the preliminary question of when, and 
                                                 
213 See generally O'Reilly, supra note 121; David C. Vladeck, The FDA and Deference Lost: A Self-
Inflicted Wound or the Product of a Wounded Agency? A Response to Professor O'Reilly, 93 CORNELL L. 
REV. 981 (2008).   - 45 - 
under what circumstances, the Chevron doctrine applies at all. These cases have thus 
been dubbed the Chevron Step Zero trilogy.
214 
  The first decision, Christensen v. Harris County,
215 held that an opinion letter 
informally issued by the Department of Labor was not entitled to Chevron deference, but 
not because it failed Chevron's two-step inquiry. The Court broadly stated that 
"[i]nterpretations such as those in opinion letters -- like interpretations contained in 
policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the 
force of law -- do not warrant Chevron-style deference."
216 Christensen also emphasized 
the importance of agency procedures in producing agency interpretations: "[t]he Court 
distinguished opinion letters and their analogues from interpretations 'arrived at after, for 
example, a formal adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking.'"
217 Rather, opinion 
letters could at most receive judicial "respect" in accordance with the Court's pre-
Chevron decision in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,
218 a case many believed to be "an 
anachronism" that failed to survive Chevron.
219 Thus, judicial deference to these types of 
interpretations would henceforth "depend upon the thoroughness evident in its 
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later 
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power 
to control."
220 This standard, known as Skidmore "respect," is notably less deferential 
than Chevron deference,
221 and arguably affords courts, rather than agencies, interpretive 
                                                 
214 See generally, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 2. 
215 529 U.S. 576 (2000). 
216 Id. at 587 (emphasis added). 
217 Sunstein, supra note 2, at 212 (quoting Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587). 
218 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
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220 Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. 
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control over ambiguous provisions of regulatory statutes.
222 Christensen also clearly 
established that Chevron has a "Step Zero" in addition to its two-step inquiry - before 
determining whether the agency has permissibly interpreted an ambiguous provision in 
its organic statute, courts must first determine whether the Chevron doctrine is applicable 
at all; if not, the court must instead evaluate the agency's interpretation under the newly-
reincarnated Skidmore framework.
223 
  Christensen's overall tenor marked a turn away from the Court's approach in 
Young discussed supra Section I.G., in which the Court afforded Chevron deference to an 
action level that the FDA set through informal processes. Christensen suggested that 
procedural formality would henceforth be a necessary condition for judicial deference. 
The decision therefore marked a major defeat for agencies, like the FDA, that utilized 
guidance as their principal policymaking tool. The Court's increased emphasis on 
procedural rigor signaled that the FDA might subsequently receive judicial deference far 
less often, and would consequently find it far more difficult to fulfill its regulatory 
mandate.
224 However, Christensen left notable ambiguities in the doctrine:  
By pointing first to the 'force of law,' and second to the processes that 
produce agency interpretations, the Court did not specify which of these 
two factors was critical to its ruling, nor did it explain the relationship 
between them. And the Court did not say whether interpretations that lack 
the force of law, or that do not emerge from relatively formal procedures, 
are always to be assessed under Skidmore.
225 
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Thus, administrative agencies would have to await further word from the Court to fully 
understand the impact of this doctrinal change on their ability to use guidance to achieve 
their regulatory objectives.  
  Unfortunately, subsequent cases only further confused the doctrine. The next 
episode in the trilogy occurred one year later, in United States v. Mead Corporation.
226 In 
Mead, the Supreme Court held that an informal and non-precedential tariff classification 
ruling by the United States Customs Service was not entitled to Chevron deference, and 
remanded to determine whether the ruling was nonetheless entitled to Skidmore 
respect.
227 The Court's rationale for its decision was opaque. The opinion suggests that 
Chevron applies "when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency 
generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation 
claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority."
228 While a "very 
good indicator of delegation" is congressional authorization to "use relatively formal 
procedures" to "produce[] regulations or rulings for which deference is claimed," coupled 
with the actual exercise of those procedures, "Chevron deference might also be 
appropriate 'even when no such administrative formality was required and none was 
afforded.'"
229 Thus, Mead supported Christensen's holding that procedural formality is an 
important factor under Chevron Step Zero, but rejected its apparent suggestion that 
procedural formality is a necessary condition for Chevron deference.
230 
                                                 
226 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
227 Id. at 221-239. 
228 Id. at 226-27. 
229 Sunstein, supra note 2, at 214 (quoting Mead, 533 U.S. at 229-31). 
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  The Court stated that the Customs rulings were not entitled to Chevron deference 
because of their procedural informality and their "sheer volume,"
231 but the Court gave 
very little guidance regarding which types of agency interpretations are entitled to 
Chevron deference. "Mead suggests that Congress might, under unidentified 
circumstances, be best read to call for deference even when an agency is not using formal 
procedures and that agency's actions lack the force of law,"
232 but Mead does not offer 
many useful clues for divining what those unidentified circumstances entail. 
  The possibility that deference could be warranted in the absence of procedural 
formality and force of law was realized one year later in Barnhart v. Walton,
233 the final 
step in the Chevron Step Zero trilogy. Although the agency at issue in Barnhart had 
"initially reached its interpretation" of an ambiguous provision of its organic statute 
"through less formal means, . . . the Court said that the use of those means did not 
preclude Chevron deference."
234 Barnhart listed a slew of previously unarticulated 
factors that bear on whether an agency interpretation warrants Chevron deference: 
[T]he interstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise of the 
Agency, the importance of the question to the administration of the statute, 
the complexity of that administration, and the careful consideration the 
Agency has given the question over a long period of time all indicate that 
Chevron provides the appropriate legal lens through which to view the 
legality of the Agency interpretation here at issue.
235 
 
                                                 
231 "Any suggestion that rulings intended to have the force of law are being churned out at a rate of 10,000 
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232 Sunstein, supra note 2, at 216. 
233 535 U.S. 212 (2002). 
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issued through notice-and-comment rulemaking" and nonetheless concluded that Chevron deference was 
warranted. Bressman, supra note 222, at 1456 (citing Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 219-221). 
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The Court therefore "read Mead to say that Chevron deference would depend on 'the 
interpretive method used and the nature of the question at issue.'"
236 Thus, after Barnhart, 
"[t]he grant of authority to act with the force of law" is no longer a necessary condition to 
receive Chevron deference; it is merely one of many important factors in an increasingly 
complicated and indeterminate balancing test.
237 
  The upshot of the Step Zero trilogy is that agencies now find it more difficult to 
receive Chevron deference and thereby defend policies expressed through informal 
means from judicial challenge.
238 Empirical data tentatively suggests that agencies have 
accordingly begun to shy away from guidance in favor of more costly notice-and-
comment rulemaking to receive greater deference and thereby effect their statutory 
mandates, although further research is necessary to confirm this.
239 Commentators 
therefore fear that Mead has contributed to the ossification of the administrative state and 
reduced agencies' flexibility to respond to changing circumstances.
240 
  To say that Mead and its brethren has been neither well-received nor well-
understood by the legal community is an understatement.
241 One scholar has labeled these 
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decisions "confusing, . . . confused, . . . ." and "downright perverse."
242 A federal 
appellate judge, emphasizing the uncertainty generated by Mead, had this to say: "After 
Mead, we are certain of only two things about the continuum of deference owed to 
agency decisions: Chevron provides an example of when Chevron deference applies, and 
Mead provides an example of when it does not."
243 Professor Bressman, in an extensively 
researched and thoughtful article on the aftermath of the Mead trilogy, observes that 
"Mead and Barnhart suggest disparate tests for Chevron deference, leaving individual 
panels (even individual judges) simply to select between them."
244 As a result, 
[S]ome courts concentrate on whether an interpretation binds more than 
the parties at hand; some broaden this analysis to ask whether, in addition 
to binding effect, the interpretation reflects public participation; some limit 
their focus to whether an agency interpretation reflects careful 
consideration; and some expand this focus, weighing careful consideration 
along with agency expertise and statutory complexity.
245 
 
Consequently, many courts use different tests to reach wildly divergent results in 
seemingly similar circumstances.
246 Other courts, faced with this palpable uncertainty, 
simply duck the question,
247 and others arguably misunderstand Mead so severely that 
they utilize the decision in completely unrelated contexts.
248 Thus, it is now largely 
unknown whether and how much deference any given agency interpretation will 
receive.
249 
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  How have these doctrinal developments affected the level of judicial deference 
that FDA guidance receives? The FDA has, in at least one case, conceded that one of its 
advisory opinions was entitled to only Skidmore deference,
250 but it is uncertain whether 
this concession was necessary as a doctrinal matter. Although it is impossible to truly 
know until greater doctrinal coherence emerges, I tentatively conclude that FDA 
guidance is entitled to Chevron deference, even though a significant number of courts 
that have addressed the issue have concluded otherwise. The following is intended to be a 
positive, doctrinal analysis; I shall address whether or not the FDA's informal guidance 
documents should receive Chevron deference as a normative matter infra. 
  I first note that FDA guidance documents that interpret FDA regulations, rather 
than congressional statutes, are likely unaffected by the Mead trilogy. "Guidance that 
clearly interprets an existing legislative rule, and not a statute, may fall outside the 
Chevron regime and instead receive Seminole Rock deference," under which an agency's 
interpretation of its own rules is given "controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous 
or inconsistent with the regulation;" a generous standard akin to Chevron deference.
251 
Because a substantial number of FDA guidance documents interpret the FDA's own rules 
rather than statutory provisions,
252 a large number of FDA policies will still likely receive 
substantial judicial deference.  
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  To determine the status of the remaining interpretations, I will first examine 
federal cases that have directly addressed the issue. Afterwards, I shall engage in my own 
independent analysis based on the numerous factors the Supreme Court has articulated in 
the Step Zero trilogy. 
 
1. Mead and FDA Guidance in the Federal Courts 
  The Supreme Court has offered little further guidance regarding the level of 
deference that informal FDA documents warrant. The few subsequent Supreme Court 
cases that have addressed both FDA policies and Mead offer little clarification.
253 For 
example, although Wyeth v. Levine held that a policy expressed in the preamble to a 
legislative rule, which counts as an advisory opinion under FDA regulations and 
therefore qualifies as an informal guidance document,
254 was not entitled to Chevron 
deference,
255 courts have noted that Wyeth's rationale was likely more influenced by "a 
defect in the thoroughness of the FDA's views,"
 256 as well as the general presumption 
against preemption of state law,
257 than by the policy's informal status. Thus, we must 
look to the lower federal courts for further direction.  
  Unfortunately, very few lower court cases are directly on point either.
258 A search 
of all federal cases involving both the FDA and the Christensen/Mead/Barnhart trilogy 
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Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 326-27 (2008) (finding statutory language unambiguous and thus 
discussing Mead only hypothetically). 
254 21 C.F.R. § 10.85(d)(1) (2011). But see Section I.H.3. supra. 
255 Wyeth, 129 S.Ct. at 1201-02 (2009). 
256 Farina v. Nokia, Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 127 n.27 (3d Cir. 2010) (describing Wyeth's rationale). 
257 See infra note 260. 
258 Several cases concerned policies expressed in legal briefs, informal adjudications, or letters to individual 
parties on case-specific matters, none of which can be classified as guidance documents for a general 
audience. See, e.g., Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Thompson, 389 F.3d 1272, 1278-84 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Apotex, Inc.   - 53 - 
revealed only two circuit court cases that directly addressed the degree of deference owed 
to FDA guidance documents. Both are from the Third Circuit, and they point in opposite 
directions. In Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corporation, the Third Circuit declined to give 
deference to FDA policy statements published in the Federal Register that purported to 
preempt state law claims, emphasizing that the policies were not formulated through 
formal procedures like notice-and-comment rulemaking.
259 However, this stress on 
procedural formality may have been more attributable to the strong presumption against 
preemption than any doctrinal changes Mead effected; many courts hold that Chevron 
deference is inappropriate when any agency opines on the degree to which its regulations 
and adjudications preempt state law.
260 Indeed, the Third Circuit previously upheld a 
FDA policy expressed in a CPG in Wedgewood Village Pharmacy, Incorporated v. 
United States, "even though the CPG was not the product of notice and comment 
                                                                                                                                                
v. FDA, 226 Fed.Appx. 4 at *1 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Sottera, Inc. v. FDA, 627 F.3d 891, 903-04 (D.C. 2010); 
Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163, 177-79 (3d Cir. 2004); Doe v. Rumsfeld, 297 F.Supp.2d 119, 131-
32 (D.D.C. 2003); Collagenex Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 2005 WL 256561 (D.D.C. 2005); Allergan, Inc. 
v. Crawford, 398 F.Supp.2d 13 (D.D.C. 2005). Although letters to individual parties may be technically 
categorized as guidance documents, they rarely set wide-ranging, general policies due to their 
individualized, case-specific nature. I have also excluded from this discussion any circuit or district court 
cases that were subsequently reversed or vacated. 
259 575 F.3d 329, 340-42 (3d Cir. 2009). 
260 Id. at 340 (emphasizing that only federal law, such as statutes and regulations, and not mere federal 
policy, may preempt state law) (quoting Fellner v. Tri-Union Seafoods, LLC, 539 F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir. 
2008)). Note that the opinion at no point mentions Chevron or Skidmore, which further indicates the court's 
decision was more likely based on the presumption against preemption than on any specific doctrine of 
deference to agency interpretations. For other cases refusing to grant deference to informal FDA statements 
claiming preemption of state law, see also, e.g., Fellner, 539 F.3d 237; In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 
489 F.Supp.2d 230, 272-74 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); Perry v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 456 F.Supp.2d 678, 682-84 
(E.D.Pa. 2006) ("Thus, to the degree that the FDA seeks to address ambiguities in the FDCA or in its own 
regulations, we will give that opinion great weight. Where, however, the agency attempts to 'supply, on 
Congress's behalf, the clear legislative statement of intent required to overcome the presumption against 
preemption,' no deference is warranted." (internal citations omitted)); Tucker v. SmithKline Beecham 
Corp., 596 F.Supp.2d 1225, 1230-33 (S.D.Ind. 2008). For cases illustrating the strong presumption against 
federal preemption of state law, see generally Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947); 
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992). As a doctrinal matter, it is currently uncertain how 
the presumption against preemption interacts with the Chevron doctrine. Compare Massachusetts v. DOT, 
93 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1996) with Brannan v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 94 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 
1996).   - 54 - 
rulemaking."
261 Although the court declined to "determine the precise level of deference, 
if any, owed the CPG because the FDA need[ed] only show that the factors outlined in 
the CPG . . . [were] a reasonable basis upon which to initiate an inspection under the 
FDCA," the court, quoting Barnhart, emphasized that the FDA's policies "reflect[ed] the 
FDA's 'careful consideration ... over a long period of time.'"
262 
  While most district court cases that address the issue withhold Chevron deference 
from informal guidance documents issued by the FDA, they do so for starkly different 
reasons. Some decisions emphasize the need for notice-and-comment procedures, and 
evaluate documents passed without formal procedures under the Skidmore framework.
263 
Others emphasize the consistency (or lack thereof) of the FDA's position, and withhold 
Chevron deference when the FDA has markedly reversed course.
264 Still others 
emphasize that the FDA's informal guidance does not bind the public and therefore lacks 
the force of law, and withhold deference accordingly.
265 Finally, some cases twist Mead 
                                                 
261 421 F.3d 263, 272-73 (3d Cir. 2005). 
262 Id. (quoting Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002)). 
263 Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 659 F.Supp.2d 279, 302-04 (2009) (refusing to grant Chevron deference to 
footnote in proposed FDA regulation that "was not incorporated into the final version of the rule and 
therefore was not subjected to the notice-and-comment procedure"); Barnhill v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 
Slip Copy, 2007 WL 6947996 at *4-6 (S.D.Ala. 2007) ("An agency's advisory opinion is entitled to 
deference only to the extent it has the power to persuade."); Weiss v. Fujisawa Pharm. Co., 464 F.Supp.2d 
666, 673-76 (E.D.Ky. 2006) ("Even though it represents FDA's formal position on a matter and obligates 
the agency to follow it until amended or revoked, an advisory opinion is also entitled only to limited 
deference because it is not subject to notice and comment procedures." (internal citations omitted)); Von 
Koenig v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 713 F.Supp.2d 1066, 1076 (E.D.Cal. 2010); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 501 F.Supp.2d 776, 786-87 (E.D. La. 2007). 
264 Weiss, 464 F.Supp.2d at 673-76 ("FDA's position has not been consistent and is therefore entitled only 
to Skidmore deference."); Kellogg v. Wyeth, 612 F.Supp.2d 421, 432-35 (D.Vt. 2008); Vioxx, 501 
F.Supp.2d at 786-87. But see Thomas L. Casey, III, Towards Function and Fair Notice: Two Models for 
Effecting Executive Policy Through Changing Agency Interpretations of Ambiguous Statutes and Rules, 
2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 725, 735 n.64 (arguing that "the 'consistency' of an agency's interpretation has 
generally not been a deciding factor in lower court cases applying Skidmore subsequent to Mead") (citing 
Hickman & Krueger, supra note 238, at 1286). 
265 Perry, 456 F.Supp.2d at 682-84.   - 55 - 
in interesting fashions to deny deference.
266 Thus, while the relevant district court cases 
suggest deference is unwarranted to FDA guidance, there is no consensus regarding why 
this is so. Furthermore, the overwhelming majority of post-Mead district court cases 
address the FDA's reversal of its longstanding policy on preemption; thus, for the reasons 
discussed previously, courts' reasons for denying deference may relate more to the strong 
presumption against preemption than the informal status of the FDA's guidance 
documents and regulatory preambles.
267 Thus, it is worth performing an independent 
analysis of the Christensen/Mead/Barnhart factors to determine how much, if any, 
deference FDA guidance should receive as a doctrinal matter. 
 
2. The Christensen/Mead/Barnhart Factors 
  I conclude that FDA guidance documents, or at least those promulgated in 
accordance with the GGPs, are entitled to Chevron deference because the bulk of the 
factors mentioned in Christensen, Mead, and Barnhart indicate that Chevron, not 
Skidmore or de novo, is the correct standard to apply. This conclusion is obviously 
tentative; the courts have not clarified how these factors should be weighed, if they are 
even to be weighed at all.
268 I further acknowledge that a number of commentators have 
                                                 
266 In Sandoz, Inc. v. Leavitt, 427 F.Supp.2d 29 (D.D.C. 2006), the court cited Mead for the proposition that 
an agency could not contradict or ease the plain terms of the statute it administers. Id. at 37 n.9. This, 
however, seems more like a Chevron Step One issue than a Step Zero issue that would necessitate resort to 
the Mead doctrine. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-
43 (1984) ("First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at 
issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, 
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."). 
267 See supra note 260. For further discussion regarding how the FDA's changed policy in preemption has 
led to lost deference, see O'Reilly, supra note 121, at 967-72. 
268 See Bressman, supra note 222, at 1445-46. But see Hickman & Krueger, supra note 238 (suggesting that 
most appellate courts use a "sliding scale" approach that balances a variety of factors).   - 56 - 
disagreed with my conclusion.
269 I nonetheless hope that this analysis can assist courts, 
academicians, regulated entities, and the FDA, and help resolve the confusion 
surrounding the Step Zero triumvirate. 
 
a. Careful Consideration and Expertise 
  Many courts, following language from Barnhart, emphasize the importance of an 
agency's careful consideration and agency expertise when determining the amount of 
deference an agency should receive when interpreting a complex statutory scheme.
270 
Although some commentators fear that the recent politicization of the FDA has eroded its 
reputation for scientific expertise, the FDA is undoubtedly an expert agency in a unique 
position to make informed judgments regarding the regulation of food, drugs, and 
cosmetics.
271 Courts continue to defer to the FDA on these grounds in similar contexts.
272 
This factor therefore strongly counsels in favor of Chevron deference for FDA guidance 
documents. In fact, some courts have already deferred to interpretations expressed in 
FDA guidance on this basis.
273 
 
b. Binding Effect and the Force of Law 
                                                 
269 See, e.g., David M. Dudzinski, Reflections on Historical, Scientific, and Legal Issues Relevant to 
Designing Approval Pathways for Generic Versions of Recombinant Protein-Based Therapeutics and 
Monoclonal Antibodies, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 143, 212-13 (2005). 
270 Bressman, supra note 222, at 1459-60. 
271 See generally O'Reilly, supra note 121.  
272 "There is no denying the complexity of the statutory regime under which the FDA operates, the FDA's 
expertise or the careful craft of the scheme it devised to reconcile the various statutory provisions." Mylan 
Labs., Inc. v. Thompson, 389 F.3d 1272, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Accord Collagenex Pharm., Inc. v. 
Thompson, 2005 WL 256561 at *8 (D.D.C. 2005); Allergan, Inc. v. Crawford, 398 F.Supp.2d 13, 21-22 
(D.D.C. 2005). 
273 Wedgewood Village Pharmacy, Inc. v. United States, 421 F.3d 263, 272-73 (3d Cir. 2005).   - 57 - 
  Other courts, citing Mead, emphasize the binding effect, or lack thereof, of the 
challenged interpretation.
274 Although it is uncertain whether guidance documents bind 
the FDA,
275 no guidance documents bind regulated parties;
276 thus, this factor probably 
weighs against Chevron deference for FDA guidance documents, although that would not 
necessarily preclude lower-level Skidmore respect.  
  There are countervailing considerations, however. First, advisory opinions and 
guidance documents purport to have general applicability even if they lack the force of 
law. Unlike the case-specific ruling letters unworthy of Chevron deference in Mead,
277 
the FDA's interpretations embodied in guidance documents "appl[y] 'equally to all 
claimants,'" which may weigh in favor of higher-level deference.
278 Finally, as previously 
explained in (arguably excruciating) detail, it is uncertain which, if any, guidance 
documents/advisory opinions bind the FDA, and to what degree.
279 Advisory opinions 
that bind the FDA would have greater claim to judicial deference than guidance 
documents that do not. This provides an additional incentive for the FDA to clarify how 
the GGPs have affected the binding status of advisory opinions. 
  In sum, while the force of law/binding effect factor weighs against deference, it 
may not do so particularly strongly. Because Barnhart indicates that the force of law is 
not necessary to receive Chevron deference, this factor may be outweighed by other 
considerations.
280 
 
                                                 
274 Bressman, supra note 222, at 1463. 
275 See supra Section I.H.3. 
276 See supra Sections I.F; I.H.1. 
277 533 U.S. 218, 232 (2001). 
278 Cf. Bressman, supra note 222, at 1462-63 (citing Wilderness Soc'y v. United States Fish & Wildlife 
Serv., 353 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2003); Schneider v. Feinberg, 345 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir. 2003)).  
279 See supra Section I.H.3. 
280 Sunstein, supra note 2, at 216.   - 58 - 
c. Formality of Procedures and Public Participation 
  Many courts, when evaluating an agency interpretation issued through procedures 
less formal than notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication, focus on 
whether the agency arrived at its interpretation using a method that facilitated 
deliberation and public participation.
281 Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's suggestion 
in Christensen that "interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and 
enforcement guidelines" are relegated to, at most, Skidmore respect,
282 Mead 
emphatically clarifies that formal procedures are not a necessary condition for Chevron 
deference.
283 The GGPs and the FDAMA established unprecedented opportunities for 
public participation in the guidance-making and guidance-revising process, and imposed 
procedural requirements akin to notice-and-comment rulemaking, albeit slightly more 
lenient.
284 This strongly suggests that FDA guidance, or at least Level 1 guidance 
documents, should receive Chevron deference. 
 
d. Other Considerations 
  Other relevant factors also counsel in favor of Chevron deference to FDA 
guidance. First, unlike the tariff classifications deemed unworthy of Chevron deference in 
Mead, guidance documents that comply with the strictures of the GGPs are not "being 
churned out at a rate of 10,000 a year;"
285 the FDA issues CPGs and guidance documents 
                                                 
281 Bressman, supra note 222, at 1458-60. 
282 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000). 
283 Sunstein, supra note 2, at 214-15 ("[T]he Court in Mead squarely rejected a possible reading of 
Christensen: that agency interpretations lacking the force of law, or not preceded by formal procedures, 
would always be evaluated under Skidmore."). 
284 See supra Section I.H.2. 
285 533 U.S. 218, 233 (2001).   - 59 - 
intended for a wide audience far more judiciously.
286 This further strengthens the case for 
judicial deference to such documents.
287 
  Secondly, Barnhart expressly states that interpretations that attempt to resolve 
questions of an "interstitial nature" are more likely to receive Chevron deference.
288 
Many of the FDA's guidance documents are intended to fill in the gaps of the FD&C 
Act.
289 This further increases the likelihood that FDA guidance is entitled to Chevron 
deference. 
  Finally, by enshrining the GGPs in the FDAMA,
290 Congress has signaled that it 
expects and desires the FDA to make policy through guidance, provided that the FDA 
follows specified procedures. Insofar as Chevron and Mead derive from the theory that 
deference is warranted when Congress has delegated interpretive authority to the agency 
and the agency has utilized the authority granted to it by Congress,
291 one could 
reasonably argue that the FDA should receive deference when it produces policies 
through a system that has received Congress's imprimatur. 
 
e. Conclusion 
  Because all of the above factors, with the single exception of binding effect/force 
of law, counsel in favor of Chevron deference, I conclude that Chevron is the appropriate 
framework to apply for FDA guidance documents. I concede that many district courts 
that have addressed the issue have concluded otherwise, but submit that these district 
                                                 
286 See Appendix A, Figure 5, infra. Accord Seiguer and Smith, supra note 12, 26 (Exhibit 5) 
(demonstrating that the FDA issues a total of approximately 100 guidance documents a year). 
287 Letters to individual firms from lower-level FDA employees may not be entitled to a high level of 
deference on this ground, however. 
288 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002); Sunstein, supra note 2, at 231-32. 
289 See supra Introduction. 
290 See supra Section I.H.2. 
291 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).   - 60 - 
court decisions were influenced more by the presumption against preemption than an in-
depth analysis of the applicable standard. Time will tell whose interpretation will prevail. 
 
J. The Present Day 
  Notwithstanding the doctrinal confusion described above, guidance is still alive 
and well at the FDA. Mead has not significantly deterred the FDA from using guidance 
as its primary method of policymaking.
292 The FDA currently produces roughly twice as 
many guidance documents per year as legislative rules,
293 and statistics suggest its annual 
output of guidance has increased regularly since the formulation of the GGPs.
294 The 
FDA continues to supply valuable guidance on a great variety of fascinating topics, many 
of which are at the forefront of scientific discovery (e.g., "Source Animal, Product, 
Preclinical, and Clinical Issues Concerning the Use of Xenotransplantation Products in 
Humans;"
295 "ANDAs: Pharmaceutical Solid Polymorphism: Chemistry, Manufacturing, 
and Controls Information;"
296 "Current Good Manufacturing Practice in Manufacturing, 
Packaging, Labeling, or Holding Operations for Dietary Supplements"
297).  
                                                 
292 Letter, supra note 101 ("It is my observation . . . that Mead has had no impact whatever on FDA with 
respect to the choice between informal guidance and notice-and-comment rulemaking. FDA has 
overwhelmingly chosen informal guidance for extremely practical reasons -- namely, the ease with which 
guidance can be issued."). Accord Appendix A, Figure 5, infra. 
293 Seiguer and Smith, supra note 12, at 25-26. 
294 See Appendix A, Figure 5, infra. 
295 Guidance for Industry: Source Animal, Product, Preclinical, and Clinical Issues Concerning the Use of 
Xenotransplantation Products in Humans (Apr. 2003), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/Xeno
transplantation/ucm074354.htm. 
296 Guidance for Industry: ANDAs: Pharmaceutical Solid Polymorphism: Chemistry, Manufacturing, and 
Controls Information (Jul. 2007), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm072866.
pdf. 
297 Guidance for Industry: Current Good Manufacturing Practice in Manufacturing, Packaging, Labeling, or 
Holding Operations for Dietary Supplements; Small Entity Compliance Guide (Dec. 2010), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/GuidanceDocuments/SmallBusiness
esSmallEntityComplianceGuides/ucm238182.htm.   - 61 - 
  From yesterday's FIDs to today's guidance documents on incredibly sophisticated 
topics, the FDA's various forms of guidance have always helped businesses avoid costly 
prosecution, and have facilitated the fulfillment of the FDA's regulatory mission. 
Ambiguities about binding effect and Chevron deference aside, it appears that the FDA 
will continue to use guidance as its primary policymaking method to effectuate its 
statutory mandate in the future. 
 
II. Advantages and Disadvantages of Guidance for Stakeholders 
  The foregoing has been a largely descriptive and historical account of the growth 
of guidance at the FDA. I now switch gears to evaluate whether, on the whole, these 
historical developments have been advantageous for the FDA's major stakeholders: 
regulated entities, regulatory beneficiaries (i.e., the general public), and the agency itself. 
I conclude that although some entities have realized greater benefits from guidance than 
others, the growth of guidance at the FDA has been beneficial overall. I nonetheless 
recommend modest reforms that could allow stakeholders to fully realize all the benefits 
of guidance while minimizing its shortcomings. 
 
A. Effect on the FDA 
  The FDA has clearly benefited overall from its increased use of guidance. First 
and foremost, the FDA's implementation of informal guidance has conserved crucial 
administrative resources. Because the FDA operates under severe resource constraints 
that make it difficult to shoulder the massive regulatory burden Congress has assigned to   - 62 - 
it,
298 guidance is a crucial weapon in the FDA's arsenal. Policymaking via informal 
guidance is far less costly and time-consuming than rulemaking.
299 As one FDA official 
has remarked, "To do a rule, it's a huge ordeal . . . there are economic analyses of the 
impact [of the proposed regulation], notice and comment, involvement of [the Office of 
Management and Budget], etc."
300 Many FDA officials have therefore agreed that using 
guidance instead confers massive cost advantages to the agency.
301 In the same vein, just 
as no statute can specify solutions in advance to every conceivable regulatory issue that 
could arise,
302 no regulation promulgated through notice-and-comment rulemaking could 
"realistically define and set forth every nuance of" the agency's approach.
303 Agencies 
must fill in the gaps. Guidance documents therefore allow agencies to inexpensively and 
quickly clarify and supplement legislative rules.
304 After all, "[i]t would be highly 
cumbersome to require rulemaking every time a detail is explained or amplified."
305  
  Moreover, although it is difficult to empirically verify, evidence suggests that 
guidance facilitates voluntary industry compliance with FDA regulations and thereby 
conserves agency resources that would otherwise be consumed by adjudication and 
                                                 
298 Vladeck, supra note 213, at 983, 989-90, 998-99. 
299 E.g., Raso, supra note 5, at 804-05; Jessica Mantel, Procedural Safeguards for Agency Guidance: A 
Source of Legitimacy for the Administrative State, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 343, 351 (2009); Seiguer and Smith, 
supra note 12, at 24. This proposition is also borne out by empirical analysis. O'Connell, supra note 5, at 
936 (data "suggests that notice-and-comment rulemaking has significant costs that agencies want to 
avoid"). 
300 Seiguer and Smith, supra note 12, at 24. 
301 Id. 
302 John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 699 (1997) 
(quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). See also Hutt, supra 
note 36, at 102. 
303 Mendelson, supra note 10, at 410. 
304 Id.  
305 Id. It should be noted, however, that the agency would not necessarily need to use informal guidance 
documents to interpret ambiguous provisions in its regulations; courts permit agencies to use a variety of 
tools to fill in gaps in their regulations. E.g., Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461-62 (1997) ("Because the 
salary-basis test is a creature of the Secretary's own regulations, his interpretation of it is, under our 
jurisprudence, controlling unless ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’ . . . Petitioners 
complain that the Secretary's interpretation comes to us in the form of a legal brief; but that does not, in the 
circumstances of this case, make it unworthy of deference." (emphasis added; internal citations omitted)).   - 63 - 
enforcement proceedings.
306 Many representatives from the food, drug, and cosmetic 
industries have explained that "industry treats guidances no differently than rules . . . 
Most business people don't know the difference between a reg[ulation promulgated 
through notice-and-comment rulemaking] and a guidance, so by and large the business 
field" is likely to follow guidance documents as if they were binding rules to avoid the 
risk of costly enforcement proceedings.
307 The likelihood that guidance averts costly 
litigation is increased by the fact that, unlike some agencies that may only threaten fines 
or inspections for noncompliance, the FDA "hold[s] gatekeeping power over private 
parties," especially in the context of new drugs and medical devices - FDA approval (or 
the lack thereof) can make or break a company.
308 "This power gives regulated entities a 
strong incentive to cooperate with the" FDA.
309 
  Also, because litigants often face difficulties obtaining judicial review of 
guidance documents,
310 the FDA may be able to "forestall expensive litigation over [a 
given] policy's validity and avoid the possibility of an adverse judicial ruling" by utilizing 
guidance instead of rulemaking or adjudication.
311 
                                                 
306 It is of course difficult to reliably estimate how many infractions would occur in the absence of 
guidance. However, anecdotal evidence collected from interviews conducted with industry representatives 
indicates that guidance does indeed prevent regulatory violations. Seiguer and Smith, supra note 12, at 27-
31. See also, c.f., FID 44 (Dec. 1, 1906) ("[I]t is evident that an overwhelming majority of the 
manufacturers, jobbers, and dealers of this country are determined to do their utmost to conform to the 
provisions of the act . . . It is hoped, therefore, that the publication of the opinions and decisions of the 
Department will lead to the avoidance of litigation which might arise."); Peter A. Joy, Making Ethics 
Opinions Meaningful: Toward More Effective Regulation of Lawyers' Conduct, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
313, 367-68 (2002) ("agency officials presumably believe that the costs [of guidance] are offset by better 
voluntary compliance and a reduced need for enforcement"); Mendelson, supra note 10, at 412-13; 
Hunnicutt, supra note 2, at 172 (citing Anthony, supra note 11, at 1328-30) ("[P]eople tend to acquiesce to 
that which the government informs them constitutes the law."). 
307 Seiguer and Smith, supra note 12, at 29-30. 
308 Raso, supra note 5, at 803-04 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360e). 
309 Id. at 803. 
310 Courts have often declined to deem policies expressed in guidance document final agency actions ripe 
for review. Mendelson, supra note 10, at 411-12; Raso, supra note 5, at 795. 
311 Mendelson, supra note 10, at 408.   - 64 - 
  Secondly, guidance facilitates regulatory flexibility.
312 Some FDA policies are 
subject to "such frequent change as to make their publication for [notice-and-comment 
rulemaking] virtually impossible."
313 Rulemaking, unlike guidance, "is ill-adapted to 
many technological and scientific problems," and may result in "rules that, by the time 
they are final, already have outlived their usefulness because technological or scientific 
advances have superseded them."
314 Guidance therefore allows the FDA to quickly 
respond to unforeseen emergencies and the rapid pace of scientific discovery and 
technological innovation.
315 For instance, only a few days after "a major break in a 120-
inch diameter MWRA pipe that transports water to communities east of Weston, 
Massachusetts," the FDA was able to formulate and release a guidance document 
advising food manufacturers of proper water-use procedures in areas affected by a boil-
water advisory.
316 Likewise, the FDA has been able to quickly issue guidance regarding 
evolving issues such as bioterrorism
317 and biotechnology.
318 Not only can guidance be 
issued relatively quickly in response to changing circumstances, it can also be "revoked 
relatively easily by publishing notice of revocation in the Federal Register."
319 Guidance 
                                                 
312 Johnson, supra note 13, at 701. 
313 40 Fed. Reg. 40682, 40695 (1975). 
314 Bressman, supra note 222, at 1483 (quoting Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: 
Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 545-46 (2003)). 
315 Seiguer and Smith, supra note 12, at 23. 
316 Guidance for Industry: Use of Water by Food Manufacturers in Areas Subject to a Boil-Water Advisory 
(May 2010), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/GuidanceDocuments/FoodDefensea
ndEmergencyResponse/ucm211373.htm. 
317 CPG § 110.300, Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism 
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (originally issued Dec. 2003), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/GuidanceDocuments/FoodDefensea
ndEmergencyResponse/ucm121288.htm. 
318 Guidance for Industry: Recommendations for the Early Food Safety Evaluation of New Non-Pesticidal 
Proteins Produced by New Plant Varieties Intended for Food Use (Jun. 2006), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/GuidanceDocuments/Biotechnology
/ucm096156.htm. 
319 Andersen, supra note 159, at 545. Mr. Andersen notes, however, that because "the FDA uses the more 
extensive notice-and-comment[-style] procedure for its guidance documents," as mandated by the GGPs,   - 65 - 
has also afforded the FDA the ability to experiment with new policies before assuming 
the risk and cost of the rulemaking process.
320 Along similar lines, guidance permits the 
FDA to establish and publicize policies for which notice-and-comment rulemaking would 
be inappropriate: some policies constitute only minor suggestions to manufacturers and 
retailers that would not justify the expense of rulemaking, while other policies are so 
"voluminous and complex" that subjecting them to public comment would produce an 
administrative nightmare.
321 Thus, many FDA officials have remarked that guidance is 
the best way to provide detailed scientific information to the FDA's constituencies.
322 
Guidance therefore provides a procedural apparatus through which the FDA can 
formulate systematic, agency-wide policies that might not otherwise exist. 
  Third, guidance allows the FDA to inexpensively regularize the conduct of low-
level employees throughout the agency, "without risking an outside suit based on later 
noncompliance with [a policy that would otherwise be promulgated as a] legislative 
rule."
323 Guidance can ensure that FDA employees all over the United States will treat 
like situations alike, without necessitating resort to the notice-and-comment process. 
  For these reasons and more, many FDA representatives perceive that the agency's 
ever-increasing use of guidance has been beneficial.
324 Downsides do exist, however. 
While guidance is often more cost-effective than rulemaking, that is not always the case. 
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"There is a sense [among some FDA officials] that the development of guidances has 
come to resemble rulemaking in terms of the extent of clearance and time required to 
develop and implement them" because of the increased proceduralization established by 
the notice-and-comment-like requirements of the GGPs, as well as other layers of 
oversight.
325 Indeed, some guidance documents "take as long as rules to develop" and can 
trigger significant paperwork burdens.
326 Thus, some of the benefits of guidance may 
have been diminished somewhat. 
  Another disadvantage of guidance relates to the FDA's perceived credibility. The 
FDA's ability to achieve its regulatory objectives depends largely on the judicial branch's 
willingness to uphold FDA policies.
327 Judges' willingness to do so in turn depends in 
part on the FDA's reputation as a scientifically expert, depoliticized agency; courts are 
more likely to defer to decisions that appear the product of impartial, considered 
decisionmaking than those that appear to result from political posturing.
328 In recent 
years, however, the FDA has begun to be viewed by some commentators, rightly or 
wrongly, as a pawn of the executive branch, for reasons largely outside the scope of this 
article.
329 Guidance threatens to exacerbate this problem. Many commentators have 
accused administrative agencies generally of misusing guidance documents to circumvent 
procedures that "protect citizens from arbitrary decisions and enable citizens to 
                                                 
325 Id. at 24, 27. 
326 Id. at 24. 
327 O'Reilly, supra note 121, at 941-48. 
328 See generally id. 
329 See generally id. (alleging that the FDA has made ill-considered policy reversals to benefit Republican 
interests during President George W. Bush's administration); Vladeck, supra note 213 (blaming the FDA's 
lost credibility on a confluence of needlessly politicized decisions, crippling resource constraints, and a 
crisis in leadership).   - 67 - 
effectively participate in the process."
330 Specifically, industry representatives have 
accused the FDA of inappropriately treating guidance documents as binding rules.
331 
Thus, heavy reliance on guidance may create the impression that the FDA is setting 
policy opportunistically and capriciously. This impression may be inconsistent with 
reality; political scientist and recent law school graduate Connor Raso suggests in a deft 
empirical analysis of guidance documents at numerous agencies, including the FDA, that, 
contrary to widespread belief, "concern over agency abuse of guidance is" generally 
"overwrought."
332 However, if the perception that agencies abuse guidance nevertheless 
persists, the FDA may find it increasingly difficult to inexpensively create policies that 
will receive the judicial branch's imprimatur. 
  Finally, the Mead trilogy threatens to severely decrease the amount of deference 
afforded to FDA guidance documents. Therefore, to the extent the FDA relies on 
guidance as its primary mode of policymaking, it may find it increasingly difficult to win 
victories in court. 
  All in all, however, it appears that the added advantages of convenience, 
flexibility, cost savings, and intra-agency discipline outweigh the disadvantages of 
guidance. Thus, I conclude that the FDA has benefited greatly from its increasing 
reliance on guidance.  
 
B. Effect on Regulated Entities 
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  The effect of guidance on regulated entities is more dichotomous. As Professor 
Michael Asimow notes, guidance is beneficial to industry insofar as it reduces 
uncertainty and mitigates business risk: 
Members of the public who live and do business in the shadow of 
regulation need to learn what the agency thinks the law means and how 
discretion may be exercised. Increasing the level of people's understanding 
about what the law requires of them is a good thing for society; it reduces 
the number of unintentional law violations, and it reduces the transaction 
costs incurred in planning private transactions.
333 
 
As a result, many representatives of the food, drug, and cosmetic industries have 
applauded the certainty that FDA guidance provides.
334 Industry players particularly 
dislike uncertainty in the form of long waiting periods; thus, even though there have been 
instances where the guidance-making process has been plagued by delays, guidance has 
greatly benefited industry by enabling the FDA to broadcast its positions on pressing 
issues sooner than would generally occur through rulemaking.
335 Guidance also provides 
certainty in the form of consistency by ensuring that lower-level agency employees will 
treat similar situations alike.
336 This provides a level playing field for industry, which 
industry representatives consider a "paramount concern."
337 
  The GGPs have provided further benefit to regulated entities. Publishing guidance 
in the Federal Register and requiring guidance documents to clearly state to what 
activities and entities the policy applies has "enhance[d] understanding among the public 
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and the Agency" and "contribute[d] to better awareness of the FDA's rules."
338 Moreover, 
as scientific advancement becomes increasingly complicated, the opportunities for public 
participation established by the GGPs are "essential" to ensure sensible regulatory policy 
"in areas where the expertise needed to develop a particular guidance . . . resides outside 
of the agency."
339 
  However, even though the GGPs allow for greater public participation, guidance 
remains less formal than the notice-and-comment rulemaking process; as a result, 
industry representatives still have a diminished ability to provide input on the policies 
that will ultimately control their operations. The fact that the GGPs approximate notice-
and-comment procedures alleviates this concern, but these procedures do not require the 
FDA to strongly consider and respond to all industry-submitted comments.
340 As a result, 
some industry representatives have stated that "even though FDA accepts comments from 
the public, . . . it is very unusual for the FDA to actually change its position or 
incorporate any of the feedback into the guidance or final rule."
341 Not all industry 
representatives share this pessimistic view, however.
342  
  Likewise, obtaining judicial review of policies expressed in guidance documents 
is quite difficult due to the finality and ripeness doctrines, unlike regulations promulgated 
through notice-and-comment rulemaking.
343 Thus, a firm that disagrees with an FDA 
policy expressed in a guidance document or believes the policy is not issued in 
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accordance with law has little recourse if the FDA refuses to acknowledge its dissenting 
comments; it must either abide by the policy or roll the dice and risk penalties.
344 
  Thus, the industry's views are divided on guidance: some businesses appreciate 
guidance for clearly delineating the legal boundaries of their activities in advance, while 
others decry its lack of procedural formality.
345 Of course, some grumbling from industry 
is always to be expected; nobody enjoys being regulated by the government, and 
businesses will naturally criticize any regime that restricts their action. That said, some of 
the industry's criticisms are valid and warranted; perhaps the FDA should pay greater 
attention to the comments it receives, although requiring the agency to respond to each 
and every important comment, as it is required to in notice-and-comment rulemaking, 
would unwisely eliminate many of the cost savings that guidance confers on the FDA and 
obliterate the distinction between guidance documents and rules.  
  The growth of guidance has thus conferred benefits and disadvantages upon 
industry. Because guidance shows no signs of flagging, industry must adapt accordingly. 
 
C. Effect on Regulatory Beneficiaries 
  Some of the features of guidance that benefit the FDA also benefit regulatory 
beneficiaries. For instance, the FDA is better able to protect the consuming public if it 
can create or modify policy quickly and inexpensively through guidance documents in 
response to changing circumstances. Given the aforementioned severe resource 
constraints at the FDA, guidance is therefore vital to protect the public.
346 Although the 
GGPs impose some additional procedural costs on the guidance-making process, to the 
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detriment of both the agency and the public, those costs are partially offset by the 
increased opportunities for public comment, which helps guard against the dreaded 
phenomenon of agency capture.
347 However, regulatory beneficiaries are less likely to get 
involved in guidance development than regulated businesses because the marginal benefit 
to any one individual from any given change in regulatory policy is unlikely to outweigh 
the costs of organizing.
348 Thus, while the GGPs may be beneficial to stakeholders 
overall, their benefit to regulatory beneficiaries is attenuated. Indeed, even though the 
GGPs create far more opportunities for public participation than the guidance-making 
procedures of other agencies,
349 some have criticized the GGPs for not going far enough 
to facilitate participation from regulatory beneficiaries.
350 
  Likewise, if judicial review of FDA guidance is difficult to obtain for regulated 
entities, it is almost impossible to obtain for regulatory beneficiaries because of the 
doctrines of standing, finality, and ripeness.
351 In particular, when the FDA issues a 
guidance document promising not to bring enforcement actions against businesses that 
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comply with enumerated requirements, regulatory beneficiaries will likely never be able 
to challenge that policy due to the rule against judicial review of agency inaction.
352 
  While it is difficult to weigh these largely incommensurate costs and benefits to 
regulatory beneficiaries, I conclude that the FDA's guidance regime, subjected to the 
rigors of the GGPs, is on balance good for the general public. If the FDA did not have 
guidance at its disposal, it would have to create policy through ossified and costly means, 
namely rulemaking and adjudication. Given the FDA's budget constraints, I argue that the 
public is better served by partially sacrificing public participation and judicial review for 
bureaucratic efficiency. Although the general public has largely lost its faith in the view 
that agencies are completely depoliticized entities that make decisions solely based on 
science, accumulated wisdom, and expertise, the FDA remains an expert agency that is 
generally in a better position than the public to set regulatory policy. The GGPs therefore 
provide the public a sufficient forum to voice their concerns regarding politically salient 
issues, while granting the agency the necessary flexibility to inexpensively formulate 
policies on important topics that are either (1) too technical, complex, and esoteric for the 
general public to understand and comment on, or (2) too mundane to generate much 
outcry.
353 The current guidance regime may have its lumps, but on the whole it appears to 
effectively balance both political accountability and cost-effectiveness. 
                                                 
352 Id. at 421-22 (citing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-32 (1985)). 
353 For instance, while it is undoubtedly important for the FDA to monitor and investigate levels of 
pathogens in dairy products, it is unlikely that the average consumer will dispute the FDA's decision to set a 
tolerance level for Bacillus cereus in milk at 10
4 cfu/g, rather than, say, 10
3 cfu/g. See Compliance Policy 
Guide § 527.300, Dairy Products - Microbial Contaminants and Alkaline Phosphatase Activity (Dec. 2010), 
available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ICECI/ComplianceManuals/CompliancePolicyGuidanceManual/UCM2384
65.pdf. While the general public's presumed inability to understand and meaningfully comment upon very 
complex FDA policies certainly does not justify totally excluding the public from the deliberative process, 
c.f. Hutt, supra note 98, at 220, the benefits of administrative ease likely outweigh the cost of decreased 
public participation in such cases.   - 73 - 
 
D. Suggested Reforms 
  Thus, it seems that the pros of the FDA's current guidance regime outweigh its 
cons. As Professor Rakoff argues,  
[i]n the process of regulating the economy through administrative action, 
processes which are partially formal, and partially informal, are to be 
preferred over either very formal processes or very informal processes. In 
other words, the general run of economic regulation -- which does not 
greatly implicate civil liberties -- will be best carried out by a process 
lying somewhere in the middle of the scale.
354 
 
The GGPs therefore create a guidance system that establishes an arguably ideal 
intermediate level of (in)formality by largely avoiding both crippling ossification and 
unchecked bureaucratic discretion. I therefore suggest no major procedural reforms for 
the FDA's guidance regime, save perhaps for the minor suggestion that the FDA do more 
to assure regulated entities that they seriously consider the comments submitted by 
industry. Rather, my reform proposals relate to the two major sources of ambiguity that I 
discussed earlier: the confusion regarding whether and which guidance documents bind 
the FDA, and the question of the degree of judicial deference owed to FDA guidance 
documents. 
 
1. The FDA Should Clarify, via Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking, that Advisory 
Opinions Are Non-Binding 
  The FDA should finish the job it started in 1992 and promulgate its previously 
proposed regulation deeming all guidance documents non-binding, be they advisory 
opinions, CPGs, etc. The FDA already acts as if many of these documents are non-
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binding, especially the CPGs;
355 the notice-and-comment rulemaking would thus be a 
simple housecleaning measure that would not significantly affect the way the FDA 
currently engages in policymaking, but would eliminate the risk that the FDA could be 
held to a policy it erroneously considered non-binding. Moreover, the proposed 
regulation would probably not encounter much opposition; of the people who submitted 
comments when the FDA did away with binding effect for guidance documents, more 
were in favor of the FDA's reversal in policy than against it.
356  
  This solution is preferable to the other options. I do not recommend that the FDA 
instead promulgate a regulation attempting to differentiate between binding advisory 
opinions and non-binding guidance documents; the two are too difficult to distinguish at 
the margins, and the regulation would therefore engender even more confusion.
357 Nor is 
it presently a viable option for the FDA to return to its 1977 regime where all guidance 
documents bind the agency; that possibility was foreclosed by the FDAMA's codification 
of the GGPs.
358 
 
2. Congress or the Supreme Court Must Clarify Mead 
  The Supreme Court's decisions in Mead and its progeny have rendered judicial 
review of all guidance documents a catastrophic mess that will continue to consume 
precious litigation resources until the confusion is resolved.
359 Mead likewise threatens to 
further ossify agency policymaking by driving agencies to costly and inflexible notice-
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and-comment rulemaking to achieve Chevron deference.
360 Many agree that either 
Congress
361 or the Supreme Court should replace Mead with an alternate approach; what 
scholars disagree about is what that alternate approach should be. 
  I first argue that Mead should be replaced with an across-the-board rule of some 
sort, rather than the indeterminate multi-factor standard that currently exists. As Professor 
Sunstein persuasively argues,  
[t]he Court seems to have opted for a complex standard over a simple rule 
in precisely the circumstances in which a complex standard makes the 
least sense: numerous decisions in which little is gained by particularized 
judgments. These are the settings in which a standard imposes high 
decisional burdens while also offering little or no gain in terms of 
increased accuracy. Because the scope of judicial review of agency 
interpretations comes up so often--indeed, because that issue is the 
opening question in a vast array of administrative law cases--the Step Zero 
trilogy forces courts to undertake complex inquiries when it is far from 
clear that anything at all is gained by the ultimate conclusion that 
Skidmore, rather than Chevron, provides the governing standard.
362 
 
There are numerous across-the-board rules that could conceivably replace Mead: (1) all 
authoritative agency interpretations of ambiguous provisions of their organic statutes 
could receive Chevron deference;
363 (2) only policies formulated through formal 
adjudication and notice-and-comment rulemaking are eligible for Chevron deference, 
while all other informal interpretations could receive, at most, Skidmore respect;
364 (3) 
informal guidance could be reviewed de novo; (4) etc. While it is beyond the scope of 
this article to opine on what standard should apply for all agencies, I conclude that, at 
least as far as the FDA is concerned, Congress should mandate Chevron deference for 
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guidance documents issued in accordance with the GGPs, or at least for Level 1 
Guidance Documents. I generally agree with Professor Bressman that "we should restrict 
Chevron deference to procedures or interpretations that reflect transparency, rationality, 
and consistency,"
365 and I argue that FDA guidance documents promulgated in 
accordance with the GGPs largely fulfill those important values. They are transparent 
insofar as they subject proposed FDA policies to a probing review process that 
approximates the rigor of notice-and-comment rulemaking and provides opportunities for 
public participation. They are rational insofar as they originate from an expert agency 
applying its accumulated wisdom to a complex statutory scheme. While I acknowledge 
that the non-binding nature of guidance may threaten the value of consistency,
366 there 
are other strong mechanisms for ensuring administrative consistency; namely, the APA's 
prohibition against arbitrary and capricious changes in policy.
367 Indeed, the Chevron 
case itself granted deference to an interpretation the agency had not held consistently 
over time; consistency is therefore decidedly not a necessary condition for Chevron 
deference, even if it is relevant.
368 Furthermore, as described supra in Section I.I.2, 
guidance documents promulgated in accordance with the GGPs fulfill many of the 
Christensen/Mead/Barnhart factors, and therefore encourage the values those decisions 
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aimed to secure. Finally, Chevron deference is desirable as a normative matter because it 
would help the FDA, an underfunded and overworked agency charged with the massive 
and vitally important task of ensuring the safety of the American people,
369 fulfill its 
regulatory objectives inexpensively without hampering its flexibility. Because empirical 
research suggests that, despite popular belief, agencies do not strategically abuse 
guidance to avoid the rulemaking process for inappropriate or improper reasons,
370 I 
argue that critics of guidance need not be so averse to applying Chevron deference to 
FDA guidance documents. Indeed, "Chevron is no blank check to agencies;" the Chevron 
two-step framework ensures "that agencies will lose if Congress has clearly forbidden 
them from acting as they have chosen," and the decision "operates as a safeguard against 
insufficiently justified interpretations."
371 Additionally, "judicial review always remains 
available for lack of substantial evidence or arbitrariness, and unreasonable agency 
decisions will be struck down even if there is no problem under either step of 
Chevron."
372 
  Thus, guidance documents should receive Chevron deference as both a doctrinal 
and a normative matter. Congress could effect this change by amending the section of the 
FDAMA that codified the GGPs to explicitly state that Chevron is the proper framework 
to apply to guidance documents, or alternatively by amending the APA to clarify the 
circumstances in which Chevron deference is applicable for all agencies. 
 
III. Possible Directions for Future Research 
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  Other possible directions for further research abound. While I have collected 
some data regarding the FDA's average annual output of guidance documents during 
various key periods of administrative law,
373 I have not undertaken a rigorous 
quantitative analysis to test for statistical significance and control for lurking variables; 
nor have I compiled matching data of the FDA's average annual output of regulations 
promulgated through formal and informal rulemaking for comparison purposes. I 
strongly urge one whose undergraduate statistics textbook is far less dusty than mine to 
investigate and compare these variables over time. It would be particularly useful to 
empirically analyze whether Mead has affected the frequency with which the FDA issues 
guidance documents; although it appears that the Mead trilogy has not significantly 
deterred the FDA from utilizing guidance,
374 statistical investigation would nonetheless 
be worthwhile. 
  Similar historical and normative analyses of policymaking at other administrative 
agencies could be performed as well. Not only would such studies be of value to persons 
primarily interested in those agencies, they would also permit a comparison of various 
agencies' behavior over time in response to changing circumstances. From this, one could 
extrapolate the ideal means of policymaking for a number of agencies, in order that 
agencies may conduct their operations in a manner that maximizes stakeholder welfare. 
To be sure, there is no "one-size-fits-all" policymaking approach for administrative 
agencies - all agencies are very different - but such scholarship could shed light on which 
methods are most effective for agencies with certain characteristics. 
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  Also, as an anecdotal matter, it would be fascinating to investigate why the FDA 
abandoned its original regulation that would have rendered advisory opinions non-
binding. 
 
Conclusion 
  The story of guidance at the FDA is full of twists and turns. After a century of 
experimentation, the FDA has stumbled upon a formula that reasonably accommodates 
the conflicting interests of stakeholders. If slight tweaks are made to resolve vexing 
doctrinal ambiguities, the FDA will be in an excellent position to protect consumers of 
food, drugs, devices, and cosmetics for the centuries to come.   - 80 - 
Appendix A: FDA Guidance by Year 
 
Figure 1. Food Inspection Decisions (FIDs) Issued by the Bureau of Chemistry Between 
1902-1927 (Approximate)
375 
 
Year  # of FIDs* 
1902  1 
1903  1 
1904  6 
1905  24 
1906  16 
1907  35 
1908  19 
1909  8 
1910  19 
1911  9 
1912  11 
1913  3 
1914  5 
1915  5 
1916  4 
1917  5 
1918  7 
1919  3 
1920  3 
1921  3 
1922  3 
1923  3 
1924  2 
1925  2 
1926  8 
1927  7 
Total  212 
Avg.  8 
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Figure 2. Trade Correspondences Issued Between 1938-46
376 
 
Year 
# of Trade 
Correspondences 
1938  6 
1939  7 
1940  336 
1941  29 
1942  18 
1943  14 
1944  14 
1945  12 
1946  3 
Total  439 
Avg./Year  49 
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Figure 3. Statements of General Policy or Interpretation Issued Between 1947-56 
(Includes Amendments)
377 
 
Year  # of Statements 
1947  2 
1948  5 
1949  6 
1950  7 
1951  6 
1952  2 
1953  5 
1954  6 
1955  4 
1956  3 
Total  46 
Avg./Year  5 
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Figure 4. Formal and Informal Statements of General Policy or Interpretation Issued 
Between 1957-1968 (Includes Amendments)
378 
 
Year 
# Formal 
Statements 
# Informal 
Statements 
Total # of 
Statements 
1957  3  13  16 
1958  3  8  11 
1959  5  3  8 
1960  3  0  3 
1961  2  2  4 
1962  2  1  3 
1963  2  1  3 
1964  4  0  4 
1965  7  0  7 
1966  7  0  7 
1967  6  1  7 
1968  12  0  12 
Total  56  29  85 
Avg./Year  5  2  7 
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Figure 5. Guidance Issued by FDA in Accordance with GGPs, 1975-2009, by Center 
(Approximate)
379 
 
Year  CBER  CDER  CDRH  CFSCAN  CVM  Comm.  Total 
1975  0  0  3  0  1  0  4 
1976  0  0  11  0  1  0  12 
1977  0  5  6  0  0  0  11 
1978  0  2  3  0  0  0  5 
1979  0  0  1  0  0  0  1 
1980  1  0  4  0  0  0  5 
1981  0  0  3  0  0  0  3 
1982  0  0  1  1  0  0  2 
1983  0  0  2  1  1  0  4 
1984  0  1  1  0  2  0  4 
1985  1  1  6  2  2  0  12 
1986  0  0  3  0  0  0  3 
1987  2  9  10  0  0  0  21 
1988  0  1  6  1  0  1  9 
1989  2  6  12  0  0  0  20 
1990  0  2  11  0  1  0  14 
1991  1  0  12  1  0  0  14 
1992  3  5  16  1  1  0  26 
1993  1  6  27  4  2  1  41 
1994  2  10  28  1  4  0  45 
1995  5  11  36  4  1  0  57 
1996  2  12  40  2  1  0  57 
1997  5  20  29  5  0  3  62 
                                                 
379 These statistics have been collected from the comprehensive list of FDA guidance documents available 
at 75 Fed. Reg. 48180, 48180-48233 (2010). (Key: CBER = Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research; 
CDER = Center for Drug Evaluation and Research; CDRH = Center for Devices and Radiological Health; 
CFSCAN = Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition; CVM = Center for Veterinary Medicine; 
Comm. = Office of the Commissioner.) Figures include both draft and final guidance, including guidance 
that is no longer effective. These figures are approximate because the list is both over- and under-inclusive. 
The figures only represent documents labeled by the FDA as "guidance" simpliciter; they do not include 
CPGs, TCs, informal letters to individual parties, or preambles to federal regulations. The figures also do 
not include revisions to existing guidance or guidance documents listed without an issuance date on the 
comprehensive list. Some figures may therefore be deflated. On the other hand, because some centers 
include some guidance documents under more than one category, some figures may be inflated. The 
statistics nonetheless paint a reasonably accurate picture of the FDA's ever-increasing use of guidance.   - 85 - 
1998  16  61  55  5  5  18  160 
1999  19  25  20  11  5  2  82 
2000  16  26  37  5  3  1  88 
2001  26  31  27  16  12  5  117 
2002  12  23  24  11  10  4  84 
2003  24  29  30  27  7  5  122 
2004  21  37  27  17  3  9  114 
2005  19  36  28  9  4  10  106 
2006  32  39  32  13  16  16  148 
2007  28  20  39  13  10  5  115 
2008  26  30  40  15  6  7  124 
2009  30  59  29  25  16  10  169 
Total  294  507  659  190  114  97  1861 
Avg.  8  14  19  5  3  3  53 
 